Patti Tamara Lenard deploys a contextual methodology to look at how and when democracies exclude both citizens and noncitizens from territory and from membership to determine if and when there are instances when such exclusion is justified. To make her case, Lenard draws on the all-subjected principle, or the idea that all those who are the subject of law - that is, those who are required to abide by the law and who are subject to coercion if they do not do so voluntarily - should have a say in what the law is. Including several examples of exclusion, Lenard argues that admission to territory and membership is either favoured by, or required by, democratic justice.
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Trust, Democracy, and Multicultural Challenges -- 1. Trust Defined -- 2. Trust as a Foundational Democratic Value -- 3. Distrust, Mistrust, and Democracy -- 4. Public Culture and Trust -- 5. Trust and Ethnocultural Diversity in Multicultural Democracies -- 6. Severely Divided Societies, Trust, and the Struggle for Democracy -- 7. Guiding Trust Building in Democracies -- Conclusion: The Challenges of Multiculturalism? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index
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In the wake of major terrorist attacks, calls for ever more draconian policies to prevent further outrages are common. Such responses raise the pressing question: is it possible to effectively fight terrorism while respecting democratic values of equality and trust? Examining recent examples of terrorist atrocities - from the murder of Muslims in New Zealand and Jews in Pittsburgh to the Charlie Hebdo attacks - Patti Tamara Lenard considers how democracies should tackle terrorism within the constraints imposed by democratic principles. For many, the tension between liberty and security necessarily means that the only way to protect security is to sacrifice liberty - but Lenard rejects this claim, and instead argues that security's goal should be to keep all citizens equally secure in the face of terrorist threats. Critiquing existing policies, from exile to racial profiling, she outlines what ethical counter-terrorism policies should look like, arguing for strategies that respect equality and thereby maintain trust among diverse communities in democratic states.
Across North America, Europe and Latin America, multiple sub-state jurisdictions have declared themselves to be migrant "sanctuaries". By adopting sanctuary status, sub-state jurisdictions signal their welcoming attitude towards migrants as well their opposition to the state-level policies that target them for exclusion. In this article, I examine the place of sanctuary in the broader literature of political resistance and opposition in democratic states, and then whether it can be justified all things considered. I locate my examination in the political theory of federalism, to identify an expectation of cooperation – which, it appears, sanctuary jurisdictions are refusing to accept, usually with respect to immigration enforcement efforts. I refer to this form of opposition as "democratic non-cooperation" and identify its key features. I describe a "cooperation continuum", to suggest that non-cooperation takes four main forms – evasion, non-engagement, disruption and obstruction – which I describe both in general terms and in relation to sanctuary practices in particular. Finally, I observe that the form of opposition that sanctuary is, is not limited to sanctuary: that is, there are other cases of this form of opposition in other policy domains, and moreover, not all of the objectives taken by those who deploy this form of opposition are progressive. Ultimately, this article's central contribution is to fleshing out modes of opposition in democratic spaces in general, by examining the morality of sanctuary actions taken around the world.
In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar offers us two concrete proposals for combatting the danger posed by the shifting border, especially to those crossing borders in search of safety. One proposal suggests that human rights travel with migrants, so that agents who control the border must take responsibility for protecting their human rights at the border. A second proposal, which forms the basis of my commentary below, asks that states consider alternative ways for migrants to seek protection safely. In responding to this second proposal, I make two proposals of my own that stem from Shachar's analysis: (1) her analysis offers us the resources we need in order to expand, not only the channels available to migrants for seeking protection, but also our sense of who should be involved in controlling admission, and (2) expanding the "who" that is involved in admission gives meaning to the concept of "moral proximity" which can help to overcome the territorial imperative that dominates the rules governing international migration, i.e., the imperative that protection travels with physical access to territory, only.
Abstract Abuse and exploitation of migrant workers in Gulf States is common and well-documented, and women domestic workers are at special risk. Sending states—often relatively poorer South Asian states—are limited in the ways that they can protect the rights of their citizens when they are labouring abroad. One strategy that sending states have deployed is the adoption of 'emigration bans' or 'emigration conditions'. Emigration bans restrict citizens from taking up temporary labour market contracts, usually in specific states, but sometimes in general. 'Emigration conditions' require would-be migrants to meet specific requirements in order to be permitted, by the sending state, to take up a labour market contract abroad. In this article, I examine whether it is morally permissible for source countries to prohibit migration to countries where they risk being exploited or abused. I examine the reasons states give to justify emigration bans and conditions: the 'structured vulnerability' reason; the 'gendered structured vulnerability' reason; and the 'gendered paternalism' reason. Overall, I agree that the reasons motivating the bans and conditions are good ones—though I offer some criticism of the reasons I describe as 'gendered paternalism'. But, since there is only limited evidence of the effectiveness of bans and conditions in achieving substantive benefit for labour migrants, and on the contrary evidence of the real harm they can sometimes generate, I argue that, absent positive evidence of success in achieving their objectives, they ought to be rejected in practice even if they are permissible in principle.
Citizenship has been treated, since World War II, as a robust political and legal status. Recent political events have prompted the reassessment of the conditions under which it can be justly removed, however. Using the lens of democratic theory, I consider one particular instance of denationalization, namely, the withdrawal of citizenship from naturalized citizens when the granting state believes that the applicant 'misrepresented' themselves, that is, engaged in some form of deception, during the process of naturalization. There is an intuitive plausibility to the thought that if an applicant for citizenship lies or fails to provide all of the requested information, she should be denied citizenship. It seems equally plausible that, if citizenship status is nevertheless granted under these conditions, it can be permissibly removed. However, I argue that this conclusion is too quick: to be permissible, denaturalization procedures must be significantly constrained, in the ways that I outline.
Abstract In December 2012, the Canadian Supreme Court issued a ruling in R v. NS, in which a Muslim woman had demanded – citing her right to freedom of religion, as protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – the right to cover her face, while giving testimony in a court of law. The defendants, also Muslim, demanded the right to see her face, in particular during cross-examination, as part of their right to the demeanor evidence that is necessary to provide "full answer and defense" and more generally as part of their right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court's ruling stated that trial judges are entitled to make determinations about whether facial coverings must be removed, by weighing the rights of the accused to a fair trial against the rights of the accuser to freedom of religious practice, via what the court termed a "sincerity test." This article considers the impact of the ruling and ultimately suggests that the decision will harm trust relations in Canada. In particular, the justifications offered in the judgment fail to respect the central objective of Canadian multiculturalism, i. e., to build trust among citizens of diverse backgrounds as a foundation for integrating minority communities into the public sphere on fair terms.
