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This paper reviews factors that significantly affected Hong Kong's rapid economic development in three consecutive periods: (i) the period of industrialization from 1952 to 1974, (ii) the period of diversification from 1974 to 1980, and (iii) the period of economic integration with China since 1980. The paper discusses the role of Hong Kong's government in the territory's development process, examines the advantages and drawbacks of Hong Kong's development strategy, and analyzes the territory's economic future. The analysis relates Hong Kong's development experience to the "endogenous growth" theory.

AbstractIn this paper we develop a theoretical model of an optimal currency basket for a small open economy. A currency basket for the home economy is defined as a chosen weighted average of a subset of foreign currencies, and an optimal currency basket is taken to be one that minimizes a given weighted average of the expected output volatility and expected inflation volatility. This theoretical model is then applied to Hong Kong, which has adopted a currency board system for close to 30 years. We estimate an optimal currency basket for Hong Kong and compare its performance with the existing currency board system as well as with currency baskets whose weights are given by export and import trade shares.

Abstract
We examine asymmetric complementary good pricing under sequential moves when a price leader (firm A) produces a main product, whereas a price follower (firm B) produces an enhancer for the main product. We show that under sequential moves there is an additional pricing regime "pseudo complements" besides the two cases obtained under simultaneous pricing, namely, (i) "independent pricing" and (ii) "bundling pricing." Under the pseudo complements regime, firm A behaves as if it is an independent monopolist, whereas firm B behaves as if the two products are strict complements. We characterize several properties of the pseudo complements regime. We show that the double mark-up problem persists in the pseudo complement regime. However, when firm A incorporates firm B's function into product A, it alleviates the double mark-up problem. We also explore how the main product's quality improvement affects the follower's R&D incentives.

We develop a model in which a main product (called product A) provides a performance quality z by itself, whereas a complementary product (called product B) is useless by itself but enhances the main product's performance quality to q > z. This asymmetric complementarity gives rise to the following results. First, if z is relatively small, then firms A and B behave as if the products are symmetrically complementary with the usual double marginalization problem. Second, if z is sufficiently large, then firms A and B price their products as if they are independent. Third, over a certain range of intermediate z, no pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

The paper explores how Hong Kong's new status as China's Special Administrative Region (SAR) may affect the competitiveness of the industries and the relative position of companies owned by non‐Hong Kong investors. The conclusion is that mainland Chinese firms will play an increasingly more important role in Hong Kong's economy and British firms will lose their dominance further. This does not, however, indicate a return to unequal competition in favor of firms from the sovereign country, but the beginning of a period of greater competition by all firms in Hong Kong, whether they be local or non‐local. There is a risk that governmental and semi‐governmental corporations of the SAR and other Chinese governments may use their official and semi‐official status to tilt the playing field in their favor, but appropriate competition law can address this concern.

The ^great firm' theory of Mughal decline relies on secondary sources for its comprehensive data base; it clarifies & extends existing economic theories of imperial decline. Most writers have treated bankers & other financial & merchant groups as segmental rather than strategic elites, but they were indispensable to the functioning of Mughal government, & the great firms' diversion of resources from the Mughals to other political powers in the Indian subcontinent directly contributed to the downfall of the empire. A working definition of great firms in the Mughal period is proposed, along with lines of further research to adequately test the theory. The advantages of this theory over others are outlined, & the bankers in Mughal India are briefly contrasted with those in imperial China. Modified AA.