Suchergebnisse

Initialement constitué de l'Iran, de la Syrie, du Hezbollah libanais et du Hamas palestinien, l'« axe du refus » a subi un coup dur dans le contexte de la guerre syrienne. Le présent texte explore le caractère disparate de cette coalition moyen-orientale, en adoptant pour angle d'approche celui du Hezbollah devenu protagoniste du conflit. Cet exercice révèle certes des intérêts communs qui expliquent la réalité partielle de ce paradigme mais il met également en relief des agendas propres à chaque acteur qui trahissent la virtualité relative de celui-ci.

Après une nécessaire introduction rappelant les spécificités historiques et démographiques du Liban, cet article dresse dans un premier temps un état des lieux (doctrine, structure, matériel, expérience martiale, etc) quant aux Forces Armées Libanaises (LAF en anglais) depuis le retrait des troupes syriennes en 2005. Il s'efforce ensuite de fournir un éclairage double (régional et national) sur les tensions communautaires présentes au sein des LAF. Au-delà de l'ennemi officiel israélien et du monitoring résiduel syrien, nous mettons en perspective la complexité des relations que les troupes du Général Kahwaji entretiennent avec la Résistance Islamique du Hezbollah d'une part et les contingents de la FINUL d'autre part. En guise de conclusion, nous évaluons les défis et les objectifs qui attendent les LAF à l'heure où la crise syrienne menace d'avoir de lourdes répercussions sur le triptyque « Armée – Peuple – Résistance ».

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been studied: pro-Assad Hezbollah and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across borders. Based on more than 50 semi-directive interviews conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, this matured version of a four-year joint research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization. On one side, Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by geo-strategic calculations and identity politics; for this group, "assabiya" has proven to be paramount. On the other side, the involvement of Sunnis takes place on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities; for these mostly atomized actors, social anomy has been found essential. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these obviously opposite social experiences (excess and lack of belonging) converge in making identity so prone to activation that individuals opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death in a cross-border conflict that is not theirs at first sight. Our research ambitions to understand these dynamics while relating them to broader factors and notably: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a cohesive national project, and the power games of regional and international actors. Both these factors have led to excessive polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization, hence sustaining the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been studied: pro-Assad Hezbollah and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across borders. Based on more than 50 semi-directive interviews conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, this matured version of a four-year joint research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization. On one side, Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by geo-strategic calculations and identity politics; for this group, "assabiya" has proven to be paramount. On the other side, the involvement of Sunnis takes place on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities; for these mostly atomized actors, social anomy has been found essential. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these obviously opposite social experiences (excess and lack of belonging) converge in making identity so prone to activation that individuals opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death in a cross-border conflict that is not theirs at first sight. Our research ambitions to understand these dynamics while relating them to broader factors and notably: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a cohesive national project, and the power games of regional and international actors. Both these factors have led to excessive polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization, hence sustaining the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

Armées et société dans le monde arabe : entre révolte et conservatisme - Jean-François DAGUZAN 7. - Les Forces Armées Libanaises Symbole d'unité nationale et objet de tensions communautaires - Didier LEROY 31. - Ethno-sociologie politique des forces armées saoudiennes - David RIGOULET-ROZE 45. - Le modèle des pâsdârân-artesh : préoccupations internes et défis externes dans le cadre du printemps arabe - Moises GARDUÑO GARCIA 71. - La FINUL dans la reconstruction post-2006 du Sud-Liban La coopération civilo-militaire en question - Julie CHAPUIS 85