Suchergebnisse

The purpose of the book is to put these new techniques at the disposal of researchers coming from different horizons, to assess the state of the art, to identify the capability of these new algorithms, to evidence the contribution of these methods to Economics and Management Sciences. It is a privileged place to expose the know-how and to discuss new developments and problems encountered in the researches. The contributions in this book bring new confirmations of the interest of connectionist approaches for researchers in Economics and Management Sciences. The first part is dedicated to theoretical advances; the second part presents a wide range of applications. All papers contain interesting results on each subject, which would have been very difficult to show with classical techniques but which has been proven by using these connectionist non linear methods. They reflect the great diversity of connectionist approaches of which we know the reader will benefit for his(her) own research. If this study enlarges the range of analysis tools for researchers in Economics and Management we will have reached our goal of sharing our interest in these new and fascinating connectionist methods

The auditor (in France, the « Commissaire aux comptes ») is to control the audited company's financial statements. The quality if his/her task depends of his/her competence and independence (De Angelo, 1981). However, some studies present a contradictory approach of the relatve status of competence and independence. Moreover the research studies, but also the post Enron regulations, have been mainly focused to independence. Is this lower interest for competence justified? Is a bad auditor mainly a dependent or a non competent auditor? We have studied the sentences pronounced against the French auditors from 1989 until 2005. We have found that, incompetence is a characteristic almost as frequent as dependence. But we have also discovered a third characteristic: personal reasons, not related neither to independence, nor competence. These new results open interesting perspectives in the audit quality research. ; L'auditeur (en France, le commissaire aux comptes) a pour mission le contrôle des états financiers de l'entreprise auditée. La qualité de son travail dépend de sa compétence et de sa dépendance (De Angelo, 1981). Cependant la plupart des travaux traitent de l'indépendance. De plus, la recherche, mais également les réglementations post Enron, s'intéressent prioritairement à l'indépendance. Ce désintérêt pour la compétence est-il justifié ? Autrement dit, le mauvais auditeur est-il plutôt un auditeur dépendant, et/ou bien un auditeur incompétent ? Nous nous sommes intéressés aux motifs de condamnation des commissaires aux comptes en France sur une période de 1989 à 2005. Nous avons mis en évidence que l'incompétence était une caractéristique quasiment aussi fréquente que la dépendance. Mais nous avons également découvert une troisième caractéristique : des raisons personnelles non liées ni à l'indépendance, ni à la compétence. Ces résultats originaux ouvrent des perspectives intéressantes dans la recherche sur la qualité de l'audit.

This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from Simunic (1980), we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show: (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings; (2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and (3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.