Suchergebnisse

In electoral autocracies, why do some people actively support political parties while others choose to not get involved in politics? Further, what differentiates those who choose to support the ruling party from those who support the opposition? Existing research has proposed that people support ruling parties primarily to extract economic benefits from the state while people support opposition parties primarily for ideological reasons. However, we lack a unified theory of partisanship, leading to indeterminant predictions about the individual predictors of partisanship. This article instead considers the social nature of partisanship in authoritarian regimes. Qualitative data collected in Cameroon highlight different processes of political socialization in an autocratic context, and data from an original survey show not only that partisan homogeneity in social networks is highly predictive of individual-level partisanship but also, at least to some extent, that partisanship can be contagious through the process of socialization within these networks.

Why do people vote in autocratic elections? Until now, most answers to this question have argued that people vote because they expect a material reward, such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying, or as a way of rewarding the regime for its economic performance. I argue that citizens also vote for different non-economic, expressive reasons, such as a sense of civic duty or a desire to improve the democratic process. I present data from an original quasi-national public-opinion survey conducted in Cameroon, which shows that expressive reasons for voting can explain more variation in voting behavior than economic reasons. These different motivations challenge the implications of existing models of democratization by explaining how some of the poorest electoral autocracies have withstood decades of economic stagnation.

AbstractWhile many analysts assume that the autocratic regime of Paul Biya is deeply unpopular amongst ordinary Cameroonians, there is almost no existing analysis of public opinion in Cameroon. In fact, Cameroonians are deeply divided in their beliefs about politics; while many view the government as democratic and legitimate, others see the regime as entirely autocratic. What explains these fundamental divides in beliefs? While existing theories point to demographic factors as the most important predictors of political opinions, this article argues that in autocratic regimes, political geography is even more important to understanding these divides. Political parties in autocratic regimes develop opposite narratives about the legitimacy of the state, and regardless of education, partisanship, age, or ethnicity, citizens living in party strongholds are far more likely to adopt these narratives than citizens outside of strongholds. Understanding these divides is critical to explaining regime legitimisation in Cameroon, and African autocracies more broadly.

Abstract
Authoritarian regimes regularly turn to the law to justify repression. This article examines whether invoking legal institutions has a persuasive effect on public perceptions of repression, and whether that effect is shaped by partisanship. The article uses the case of Cameroon's Special Criminal Tribunal, created in 2011 to prosecute high-profile corruption cases. A survey experiment was designed that describes the arrest and trial of a suspected corrupt oppositional minister and reminds a treatment group about the Special Criminal Tribunal. The results show that neither regime nor opposition partisans are swayed by legal justifications for repression. By contrast, nonpartisans respond negatively to autocratic legalism, particularly those with low levels of regime trust. The article clarifies when autocratic legalism might be used for public legitimation, suggests that partisanship is a useful lens for understanding public opinion in an autocracy, and elaborates upon the meaning of nonpartisanship in electoral authoritarian regimes.