Suchergebnisse

Le 13 décembre 2015, la loi sur la Solidarité et le renouvellement urbains, dite loi SRU, a fêté ses quinze ans. Son article le plus connu, l'article 55, est aussi le plus important et le plus ambitieux, puisqu'il enjoint les grandes communes d'accueillir au moins 20 % de logements sociaux sur leur territoire à l'horizon de 2022. Cet article de loi, plutôt controversé, a fait l'objet de multiples tentatives de « détricotage » durant les années 2000. Il a finalement été renforcé dans le cadre des lois Duflot, à la fois dans ses objectifs – les quotas ayant été portés à 25 % dans un certain nombre de villes – et dans ses moyens – les communes contrevenantes perdant une partie de leurs prérogatives, qui reviennent au préfet. L'article se propose d'établir un bilan sur la loi SRU et sur ses quotas de logements sociaux. Fort de ce bilan quantitatif et qualitatif, l'article cherche plus généralement à offrir une mise en perspective des renforcements récents de la loi.

Less than six months after its entry into the European Union (EU), theexcessive deficit procedure (EDP) has been opened against Croatia. The government of Croatia now has to propose a corrective plan in order to bring the public deficit below 3% of GDP within a few years2 .It is not the first time that an EDP coincides with entry into the EU. In 2004, six new members (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) were subject to a similar experience. But times are different. As Croatia entered the EU, the economies of its main trading partners were plagued by more than five years of crisis, and the negative risks for their projected recovery were still significant3. Economic conditions were comparatively much better in the EU in 2004. As a result, to bring its public deficit below 3% of GDP, a country under EDP could reasonably expect that a significant part of its adjustment would come from higher growth rather than from pure fiscal consolidation (expenditure cuts and/or tax increases). Yet, in 2004, the financial markets were aware of that and, consequently, required only minor additional risk premiums on the public debt of countries under EDP

Less than six months after its entry into the European Union (EU), theexcessive deficit procedure (EDP) has been opened against Croatia. The government of Croatia now has to propose a corrective plan in order to bring the public deficit below 3% of GDP within a few years2 .It is not the first time that an EDP coincides with entry into the EU. In 2004, six new members (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) were subject to a similar experience. But times are different. As Croatia entered the EU, the economies of its main trading partners were plagued by more than five years of crisis, and the negative risks for their projected recovery were still significant3. Economic conditions were comparatively much better in the EU in 2004. As a result, to bring its public deficit below 3% of GDP, a country under EDP could reasonably expect that a significant part of its adjustment would come from higher growth rather than from pure fiscal consolidation (expenditure cuts and/or tax increases). Yet, in 2004, the financial markets were aware of that and, consequently, required only minor additional risk premiums on the public debt of countries under EDP

This article provides an assessment of labour market adjustments occurring in Estonia during the global crisis. As part of the so-called internal devaluation, the strategy followed was very successful in shrinking the unit labour costs, thus helping Estonian enterprises to gain international competitiveness. The whole gamut of tools available in terms of flexibility was used, at least in the worst time of the financial crisis: massive lay-offs, reduced working time and wage cuts. At mid-2011, Estonia stood as one of the most dynamic EU country to recover with exports growth. On the social side, however, the track record is not as positive: the purchasing power of workers has been reduced and unemployment still remains strong and persistent despite the economic recovery.

This paper emphasises that, for the less advanced European Union countries, FDI inflows are an important engine of convergence towards their more advanced counterparts. In general, CEECs and Cohesion countries hosting FDI tend to grow faster than those receiving few FDI. Not only the level but also the sectoral composition of FDI matters. Multinational corporations, by carrying out technically demanding production functions, have contributed to upgrade the production capacities of receiving CEECs and to increase the technological level of goods produced there. Competing on similar markets, but with higher wages and lower human capital endowments than CEECs, Portugal has lost its "comparative advantage" with the entry of CEECs as a possible destination of export-oriented FDI. This "diverting effect" explains a part of the disappointing performances of Portugal in terms of catching up. Thus, the relevant issue is no longer whether CEECs will follow an Irish or a Portuguese convergence scenario, but rather whether Portugal will converge or diverge towards CEECs.

This paper emphasises that, for the less advanced European Union countries, FDI inflows are an important engine of convergence towards their more advanced counterparts. In general, CEECs and Cohesion countries hosting FDI tend to grow faster than those receiving few FDI. Not only the level but also the sectoral composition of FDI matters. Multinational corporations, by carrying out technically demanding production functions, have contributed to upgrade the production capacities of receiving CEECs and to increase the technological level of goods produced there. Competing on similar markets, but with higher wages and lower human capital endowments than CEECs, Portugal has lost its "comparative advantage" with the entry of CEECs as a possible destination of export-oriented FDI. This "diverting effect" explains a part of the disappointing performances of Portugal in terms of catching up. Thus, the relevant issue is no longer whether CEECs will follow an Irish or a Portuguese convergence scenario, but rather whether Portugal will converge or diverge towards CEECs.

The debate about unilateral euroisation (i.e. the unilateral adoption of the euro as legal tender) that emerged in CEECs at the end of the 1990s has finally ebbed in 2000 following the very negative reaction of the EU officials. We argue, however, that we may potentially see a renewal of the debate in the future if the institutional path set by EU to introduce the euro is not modified. Indeed, both the political and the economic context are now radically different from the ones existing in 2000. In this paper, two main lines of argument are developed. First, the credibility of (implicit) sanctions in the event of unilateral euroisation is currently very low, even nil, because acceding countries are now de facto economically and politically integrated into the EU. Second, the recent economic slowdown and a recovery that has not been as strong and fast as expected, have resulted in a halt to the nominal convergence process that may delay their entry in EMU. Given the risk of unilateral euroisation, we argue that either consensual euroisation or, at least, a relaxation of nominal convergence criteria would be a better option from the viewpoint of both current and future members of EU. JEL classifications: F33, F15, F02

The debate about unilateral euroisation (i.e. the unilateral adoption of the euro as legal tender) that emerged in CEECs at the end of the 1990s has finally ebbed in 2000 following the very negative reaction of the EU officials. We argue, however, that we may potentially see a renewal of the debate in the future if the institutional path set by EU to introduce the euro is not modified. Indeed, both the political and the economic context are now radically different from the ones existing in 2000. In this paper, two main lines of argument are developed. First, the credibility of (implicit) sanctions in the event of unilateral euroisation is currently very low, even nil, because acceding countries are now de facto economically and politically integrated into the EU. Second, the recent economic slowdown and a recovery that has not been as strong and fast as expected, have resulted in a halt to the nominal convergence process that may delay their entry in EMU. Given the risk of unilateral euroisation, we argue that either consensual euroisation or, at least, a relaxation of nominal convergence criteria would be a better option from the viewpoint of both current and future members of EU. JEL classifications: F33, F15, F02

On 1 July 2013, 10 years after applying for membership of the European Union, Croatia will become the 28th EU Member State and the second country in the former Yugoslavia to join the EU. In this note, after a rapid review of the state of play, we will return to what seems to us to be the two main weaknesses of the country: on the one hand, its lack of competitiveness and, on the other hand, its level of corruption still far too high to ensure sustained and sustainable growth (.). ; Le 1er juillet 2013, 10 ans après avoir déposé sa demande d'adhésion à l'Union européenne, la Croatie deviendra le 28e État membre de l'UE, et le deuxième pays de l'ex-Yougoslavie à intégrer l'Union. Dans cette note, après un rapide état des lieux, nous reviendrons sur ce qui nous semble être les deux principales faiblesses du pays : d'une part, son manque de compétitivité, et d'autre part, son niveau de corruption encore beaucoup trop élevé pour lui garantir une croissance soutenue et durable (.).