Suchergebnisse

Foreign policy events, including secessionism and independence movements, become objectified for most citizens through media coverage. Accordingly, I look at the coverage of Kosovo's and Scotland's bids for independence in the two top national newspapers,The New York TimesandThe Washington Post.Scholarship in international law, democratic theory, and comparative politics might have valuable insights on independence processes, but it is the media frames inspired by these strands of theoretical literature that shape public opinion and/or reflect policy-makers' preferences (and biases) in the foreign policy arena. I find that print media can engage in theoretically sophisticated coverage of secessionist movements, which often echoes scholarly insights derived from the relevant academic literature. The two European case studies show consistent application of tropes and frames that one would find in the academic publications on the subject. Yet these cases also illustrate profound differences in media framing not reducible to objective legal and political differences between the two events. US foreign policy considerations also appear to play a role in explaining variance in media frames.

This article analyzes political and social themes of Russia's glossy magazines which represent the few remaining public spaces for surviving freedom of speech and expression in that post-communist country. As authoritarian nature of Russian political system deepens, the democratic openings often appear in unexpected places. Content analysis of two glamour monthlies, one (GQ-Russian Edition) intended for male audience, another (Cosmopolitan-Russia) – for female readership, shows consistently oppositional (anti-Putin) thrust of both publications, but also persistent political gender stereotypes. Analysis of these publications, intended for Russia's nascent urban class – traditionally a social strata most associated with democratic impulses – provides an important explanation behind recent democratic protest activities in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Did the ideological discourse of the KPRF, the communist successor party in post-Communist Russia, evolve in the same direction as the identity and discourse of the majority of ex-communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe which now embrace social democracy? In particular, did the KPRF's Marxist-Leninist and nationalist-socialist rhetoric change with time as the political climate for its functioning as the only viable Russian opposition party continued to deteriorate? This question is addressed through content analysis of public documents and internal party documents, which reveals that the latter are considerably more liberal and democratic in tone than the former. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Did the ideological discourse of the KPRF, the communist successor party in post-Communist Russia, evolve in the same direction as the identity and discourse of the majority of ex-communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe which now embrace social democracy? In particular, did the KPRF's Marxist–Leninist and nationalist–socialist rhetoric change with time as the political climate for its functioning as the only viable Russian opposition party continued to deteriorate? This question is addressed through content analysis of public documents and internal party documents, which reveals that the latter are considerably more liberal and democratic in tone than the former.

This introduction to the special section on the history education in contemporary Russia and Ukraine discusses selected articles in the context of comparative scholarship. It isolates important implications for the burgeoning field of political socialization in the post-communist societies.

This article investigates the extent of continuity and discontinuity of the original political, economic, and foreign policy value orientations of Russian and Polish post-Communist elites. I conclude that during the post-Communist period the Russian elite shifted the priorities from pro-democratic to authoritarian positions, engaged in a debate over the most desirable foreign policy course, and ultimately chose a pragmatically independent direction, but remained loyal to original beliefs in the free market. In Poland, with its cyclical rotation of governments, original pro-democratic and pro-Western elite value orientations survive to this day, while the issue of preferred economic model is contested and highly sensitive to electoral cycles.