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This correspondence is a response to Courtland Adams, Tobias Ide, Jon Barnett & Adrien Detges (2018), "Sampling bias in climate–conflict research" Nature Climate Change 8 (200–203) doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0068-2. Adams et al argue that claims regarding climate-conflict links are overstated because of sampling bias. However, this conclusion rests on logical fallacies and conceptual misunderstanding. There is some sampling bias, but it does not have the claimed effect.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: Conceptual.Research Question/Issue: Shareholding structures are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to know who are the actual owners and controllers of a firm. In particular, in continental Europe and Asia, control tunnelling appears frequently through pyramidal structures. Different methods exist to isolate control from ownership. This paper attempts to better understand these different models and their implications.Research Findings/Results: After describing ownership structure through a graph association, this paper analyzes the voting game at stake in the race for control. It compares existing methods and algorithms to identify the owners and controllers of a firm in a pyramidal structure without cross‐ownership. These different methods are then applied to the case of a Belgian retailer, Colruyt. The results are compared and the influence of a control threshold is analyzed. Furthermore, it shows how the ownership structure allows the Colruyt family to maintain control of the firm even if there is dissension within the family.Theoretical Implications: This study clarifies definitions of ownership structures and provides a better understanding of models that analyze ownership structure and their implications.Practical Implications: In practice, these models can help shareholders achieve a majority of voting rights in the general assembly by identifying who are the influential partners. Furthermore, the models provide a means for external parties to determine whether control of a firm is attainable, and if so, how. Established shareholders may also use these models to ascertain the optimal ownership structure that will preserve their control with a minimum level of investment.

The company Elia, which manages the grid system of electricity in Belgium, is mainly controlled by the principal producer of electricity, Electrabel, and by political powers. The Belgian state has recently constrained the French group to yield 3% of its stake in Elia as foreseen in the Pax Electrica agreements. This article studies the impact of this transfer by means of the Banzhaf index that measures the intensity of control. The results show that theoretically these agreements change the power relationship on the manager of the grid. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Evaluates possible linkages from processes of environmental degradation to deterioration in security positions; US.

The dynamics of moving a deadlocked prisoners' dilemma conflict toward a cooperative resolution are examined. The effects of recalcitrant parties are elaborated by developing the concepts of the imposed deadlock game and the cooperation threshold. The threshold is the degree of certainty of achieving a cooperative solution (the R payoff) necessary to induce cooperation. It is lowered (making cooperation more likely) when either the benefits from cooperating or the costs of holding out increase. This concept is used to explain how agreement can be reached on seemingly nonnegotiable issues. In U.S. efforts to mediate the Numibia conflict, both Carter and Reagan failed to deal effectively with South Africa's high cooperation threshold. The Reagan administration also added elements of simultaneous play by introducing linkage, further lessening cooperative prospects. Cooperation may nevertheless have become more likely when South Africa began pursuing a different, more certain, cooperative goal. However, inappropriate mediation and unfavorable events made a final agreement impossible.

By artificially inflating capital and creating own shares, cross-ownership can be a key device for managerial entrenchment. This paper proposes a game-theoretical method to measure the extent of shareholder expropriation through cross-ownership. By properly accounting for cross-ownership linkages, we show how managers can seize indirect voting rights, and so insulate their firms from outside control. Significant examples of cross-ownership are found not only in civil law countries, but also in the U.S. mutual fund industry. We apply our method to Germany's Allianz Group. This paper paves the way to better regulatory appraisal of management entrenchment through cross-ownership. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Cross-ownership breaks the traditional rule of one-sided corporate control. Using a novel approach based on stochastic voting processes, this paper proposes a general method to determine control stakes in the presence of cross-ownership. It offers a generalization of the Banzhaf index, which allows coping with cross-ownership-inclusive ownership graphs. The original feature of this approach is its absolute sequentiality. We also operationalize this new approach by building an algorithm, which determines the shareholders' respective control powers in any corporate structure. From a governance viewpoint, we emphasize that cross-ownership may act as a powerful device for shareholders' expropriation. To make this point, we revisit the leading example of the German Allianz Group. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) are a key instrument of the Federal Government's new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs. SRAs, described by the Government as a form of 'mutual obligation', require Indigenous communities to commit to behavioural changes or other actions in order to access 'discretionary' government funding for infrastructure or services. There are significant political, moral and practical issues raised by SRAs. In this paper we contend that despite the language of mutuality, flexibility and choice that accompanies SRAs, the approach appears more aptly associated with 'divide and conquer' tactics and a subtle shifting of responsibility for problems from governments to Indigenous communities themselves. In this paper we explore the concepts of mutual obligation and reciprocity, the structural biases that favour the state and its agencies over Indigenous communities in the SRA negotiation process, and issues of citizenship entitlements and accountability that are raised. Finally, acknowledging that SRAs can be a means for Indigenous communities to access greatly needed funding, we suggest various strategies and measures that could be taken up to make the SRA framework more equitable and effective.