In this paper, I will propose that there are three bodies of power present in Shakespeare's Richard II. The first two bodies present, the body politic and the body natural, were introduced by Ernst Kantorowicz in opposition to Carl Schmitt's Political Theology. The third body introduced is the pseudo body, which is a temporary body used by the body politic to depose the body natural. I will argue that Richard's actions allow Bolingbroke to become the pseudo body through the backing of the body politic. And that Bolingbroke's role as the pseudo body enables him to become the king.
This article compares transnational conservation organizations' efforts in Ecuador, Chile, and Peru in order to answer several questions: Why do transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) engage in the politics of some nations but not others? Do TSMOs shape the policy decisions of less developed nations? What is the relationship between national political opportunity structure and transnational mobilization? Based upon historical data and fieldwork data, I argue that transnational conservationists can most easily affect the policies of politically "open" nations that have active domestic conservation movement organizations. In addition to influencing public policies, transnational conservationists are key actors in the development of private systems of biodiversity protection. Operating according to "lifeboat ethics," TSMOs select nations based on political criteria, while those nations most in need of conservation assistance (biodiversity hotspots) are neglected. This strategy contrasts sharply with strategies used by the transnational human rights movement.
Key players and conflicting goals in the development trajectory -- The Ecuadorian context -- Ideal types of environmentalism -- Origins, 1978 to 1987: ambientalistas and ecologistas emerge -- Neoliberal boom, 1987 to 2000: the rise of ecodependence -- Organizational bust, 2000 to 2006: opportunities for ecoresisters and ecoalternatives -- Citizens revolution, 2006 to 2015: the rise of the paradoxical state -- Hypotheses from Ecuador
This paper explores efforts by Denison University to shift its service-learning efforts from service based on a charity model toward service based on collaboration and community-based social change. The author describes the institution's process of adaptation and a series of service-learning courses that draw upon participatory action research, asset-based community development, and what Denison service-learning faculty call "place-based" service learning. Based on ethnographic data and reports from students' reflective journals from courses that have attempted to develop a partnership with a nearby community, the author outlines some of the challenges for faculty and institutions that are considering crossing-over from service learning based on charity to service learning for social justice.
Objective This study investigates the trends in the distribution of environmental aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. foundations, and a multilateral donor, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), to determine whether aid is driven by donor interests or recipient need.Methods Data from USAID, the Foundation Center, GEF, and other secondary sources are analyzed using logistic and OLS regressions.Results Traditional donor interests (politics, economics, and security) and donors' environmental interests (those favoring "global" environmental concerns over local ones) explain which nations receive environmental aid and which do not and how much nations receive. In general, the allocation of environmental aid differs from that of official development assistance. The United States does not demonstrate a middle‐income bias; multilateral aid is not more "humanitarian" than bilateral aid. Foundations' allocation patterns favor traditional donors interests.Conclusions Environmental aid does not target the nations that are most in need of abating local pollution. Instead, environmental aid donors favor nations with whom they have had prior relations (economic and security), nations that are democratic, and nations with unexploited natural resources. In short, donor interests outweigh recipient need.
Objective. This study investigates the trends in the distribution of environmental aid from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), US foundations, & a multilateral donor, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), to determine whether aid is driven by donor interests or recipient need. Methods. Data from USAID, the Foundation Center, GEF, & other secondary sources are analyzed using logistic & OLS regressions. Results. Traditional donor interests (politics, economics, & security) & donors' environmental interests (those favoring "global" environmental concerns over local ones) explain which nations receive environmental aid & which do not & how much nations receive. In general, the allocation of environmental aid differs from that of official development assistance. The United States does not demonstrate a middle-income bias; multilateral aid is not more "humanitarian" than bilateral aid. Foundations' allocation patterns favor traditional donors interests. Conclusions. Environmental aid does not target the nations that are most in need of abating local pollution. Instead, environmental aid donors favor nations with whom they have had prior relations (economic & security), nations that are democratic, & nations with unexploited natural resources. In short, donor interests outweigh recipient need. 2 Tables, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.
The decision-making processes of transnational social movement organizations are studied to indicate how such organizations determine where to deploy their conservation strategies. An overview of transnational organizations concerned with various conservation issues is presented, emphasizing these organizations' primary strategies for preserving biodiversity. Informed by the thought of transnational conservationists & the concept of political opportunity structure, the participation of various transnational social movement organizations in Ecuador, Chile, & Peru is investigated. The domestic political structure, presence of nongovernmental organizations, & involvement of transnational organizations in each nation are analyzed, & factors responsible for the high level of transnational organization involvement in Ecuador, the moderate level of participation in Peru, & the low level of involvement in Chile are noted. Differences between transnational conservation, environmental, & human rights movements are pointed out. 1 Table, 76 References. J. W. Parker
This article compares transnational conservation organizations' efforts in Ecuador, Chile, and Peru in order to answer several questions: Why do transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) engage in the politics of some nations but not others? Do TSMOs shape the policy decisions of less developed nations? What is the relationship between national political opportunity structure and transnational mobilization? Based upon historical data and fieldwork data, I argue that transnational conservationists can most easily affect the policies of politically "open" nations that have active domestic conservation movement organizations. In addition to influencing public policies, transnational conservationists are key actors in the development of private systems of biodiversity protection. Operating according to "lifeboat ethics", TSMOs select nations based on political criteria, while those nations most in need of conservation assistance (biodiversity hotspots) are neglected. This strategy contrasts sharply with strategies used by the transnational human rights movement. (Mobilization / FUB)
