Suchergebnisse

East Asia has been at peace for more than a quarter century. For nearly every East Asian country save the most laggard, this long peace, to borrow John Lewis Gaddis words, has brought about unprecedented economic development and internal growth. The economic slump brought about the financial crisis of 1978-79 notwithstanding, East Asia continues to move forward and grow, becoming more interconnected, ever more interdependent, and increasingly more transparent. In the age of instant telecommunication and the internet, the process of integration and interdependence is likely to accelerate not slow. Arguably, after nearly a century of bloody conflict, destruction, and lost opportunities, East Asian states have finally come to appreciate the benefits of cooperation over conflict. It would, of course, be premature to assert that the dangers of renewed conflict in the region have declined to genuinely tolerable levels. North Koreas capacity to make trouble, the potential volatility of the China-Taiwan relationship, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, are among the more obvious areas of concern. Tension in between the United States and China over the introduction of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is the latest issue of contention clouding the regional security horizon. But in spite of these problems, East Asia is a fairly stable place at this juncture. There are no immediate political or military challenges that threaten to undermine the regions fundamental strategic stability. Nor is there any permanent basis for hostility amongst the major players in East Asia. The dangerous fires of militant nationalism that inflamed the region in the first half of the past century, and the antipathetic ideologies that fueled the Cold War for most of the second half, have now receded into history. In spite of East Asias apparent strategic stability, however, the major regional actors appear to be as preoccupied about their security as ever. What accounts for this paradox? Are security prospects for the region timely darkening as we enter this century? Or does the professed unease instead reflect exaggerated or unfounded fears and suspicions? What ought to be done in order to maintain strategic equilibrium, promote cooperative behavior on the part of potential rivals, and extend peace in the region?

The objective of this brief essay is to think about what a reunified Korea's internal makeup and strategic disposition might be. For many Korea-watchers inured to the seemingly endless North-South Korean duel, this may appear to be something of a surreal exercise. This will be particularly true of those in the "gradualist" camp who do not consider North Korea's collapse/transformation to be imminent. At best, they will see essays such as this to be little more than idle speculation about something that is not likely to materialize in the foreseeable future-- especially given North Korea's apparent ability to withstand stunning strategic setbacks thus far. But what if the North Korean regime, and the brittle, exhausted system which they command (amidst growing signs of disorder), were to suddenly come apart? While we may not be able to accurately predict how or when North Korea might cease to be a going concern, so long as there exists the probability that Pyongyang could lose its grip (and there clearly is), it would be the better part of wisdom to try to anticipate and prepare as best we can for such an eventuality.

The end of the Cold War has precipitated a major rethinking of the United States' international commitments in both the scholarly and policymaking communities. For the first time in nearly half a century, the United States is fundamentally reconsidering both its military and economic relations with the outside world. However, the debate over how to restructure US foreign policy has generally focused on Europe. When analysts have referred to Asia, the emphasis has generally been on economic problems in the region. Similarly, the thrust of these works has tended to remain short-term, looking at the immediate future. This paper challenges these viewpoints. It argues that East Asia is as important as Europe to the United States, for security as well as economic reasons. The paper looks at the long-run as well as short-run trends in East Asia, and argues that the issues the US will face in the future will not arise solely from its traditional adversaries-a major problem will be managing conflicts within alliances.

Lecture. Compares security factors and economic and political stability.

Blacker, C. ; Goncharov, S.: Sino-Soviet relations. - S. 1-9 Titarenko, M. L.: Trends in global policy and their impact on the international political situation in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 11-20 Miasnikov, V.: Balance of interests in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 21-29 Kislov, A.: Soviet security interests in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 31-38 May, M.: Asian-Pacific security and nuclear weapons deployment. - S. 39-48 Goodby, J.: Operational arms control as the harbinger of a U.S.-Soviet cooperative security regime. - S. 49-64 Yakovlev, A.: The Chinese factor in the evolving non-confrontational system of international relations in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 65-72 Sagan, S.: Mutual security interests in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 73-77 Okimoto, D.: U.S.-Soviet detente and possibilities for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. - S. 79-122 Zharkikh, Y.: Economic factors of Asian-Pacific security. - S. 123-129 Goodby, J.: Confidence- and security-building on the Korean peninsula. - S. 129-142 Ognev, Y.: International political-military aspects of a peaceful Korean settlement. - S. 143-150 Larin, A.: The "One Nation-Two System" problem in the Asian-Pacific region. - S. 151-157 Lho Kyongsoo: The major powers and inter-Korean relations. - S. 157-164 Razov, S.: Sino-Soviet relations. - S. 165-168 Di, H.: Whither China. - S. 169-177 Fingar, T.:Sino-U.S. relations. - S. 179-185