Suchergebnisse

AbstractHow is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of "favorable versus unfavorable," especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific policy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in public opinion about China may lead to misguided policies.

On March 15, 2019, the National People's Congress passed a long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL) after a short deliberation period of only three months. This expedited legislative process seems unusual, considering that the original draft of the FIL proposed by the Ministry of Commerce in January 2015 was tabled indefinitely after a brief period of public consultation. How can we explain this stark difference? Comparing the legislative processes and contents of the two laws, this paper shows that, as with many previous laws, bureaucratic politics likely contributed to an impasse in the 2015 draft, whereas external shocks—in this case, the escalating trade war between China and the United States—helped accelerate the deliberation process and the passage of the new FIL. These two cases demonstrate the durability of lawmaking institutions and procedures under Xi Jinping despite the recentralization of power in the executive after changes to the constitution.

This article reviews China's change from cautious observer to active participant in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system over the past decade. It argues that normative, rather than material, constraints deterred China from WTO litigation in the initial years of its membership.

"Global supply chain integration is not only a rapidly growing feature of international trade, it is responsible for fundamentally changing trade policy at international and domestic levels. Ka Zeng and Xiaojun Li argue that global supply chain integration pits firms and industries that are more heavily dependent on foreign supply chains against those that are less dependent on intermediate goods for domestic production. Given that final goods are produced with both domestic and foreign suppliers, businesses whose supply chain will be disrupted as a result of increased trade barriers should lobby for preferential trade liberalization to maintain access to those foreign markets. Moreover, businesses whose products are used in the production of goods in foreign countries should also support preferential trade liberalization to compete with suppliers from other parts of the world. This book uses multiple methods, including cross-sectional, time series analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members; a firm-level survey; and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. The authors show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade policy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries."

Abstract
This article investigates how superpower rivalry affects public perceptions of international organization (IO) legitimacy in the hegemon. We argue that the representation of a superpower rival state at an IO in the form of its key decision maker's nationality can dampen the IO's perceived legitimacy within the rival power. We test this argument using a survey experiment in the United States under President Trump, where we manipulate the nationality of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judge who casts a tie-breaking vote against the United States. Our results show that when the judge is Chinese, there is a strong and robust dampening of Americans' perceptions of the ICJ's legitimacy, with no comparable effect arising when the judge is from other countries, including Russia. Replication of the experiment in the United States under President Biden offers external validity for our findings, which may have important implications for the future of the liberal international order.

Over the past decade, Chinese law has undergone a considerable number of major reforms, ranging from the high-profile constitutional amendments to the implementation of multiple online platforms, which have significantly altered legal practice and the judicial process. While scholarly debate remains split over whether China is turning away from law or is becoming more legalistic, there is little empirical understanding of how Chinese law and the legal system are perceived by those most affected by it, namely the Chinese citizens. This article fills the critical gap by leveraging an original public opinion survey of more than 5,000 Chinese adults to examine their views on issues such as the importance of law and the status of legal development in relation to economic growth. The findings suggest that Chinese citizens with actual experience of the legal system—whether from study, practice or personal involvement in litigation—hold vastly different views on many of these issues from those without such experience. The findings also suggest that important policy initiatives introduced by the Chinese leadership and the judiciary, such as the emphasis on constructing a socialist rule of law and the potential introduction of some system of case law, may enjoy popular support. (China/GIGA)

We explored the effect of two forms of maltreatment of children (emotional and physical) on two kinds of envy in adulthood (benign and malicious), and the moderating role of psychological resilience in these associations. Participants were 676 Chinese undergraduates who completed the
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale, and the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale. The results indicate that of the two types of childhood maltreatment, only emotional maltreatment negatively predicted benign envy and positively predicted malicious envy. Psychological
resilience played a moderating role in the childhood emotional maltreatment–benign/malicious envy link and childhood physical maltreatment–malicious envy link. These results reveal the direct relationships between different types of childhood maltreatment and benign/malicious envy
and the moderating effect of psychological resilience in these associations. Our findings have theoretical and practical implications for cultivating psychological resilience to inhibit malicious envy and promote benign envy in adults.

Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders' backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China's international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders' foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.

Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders' backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China's international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders' foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.