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"The book tells the story of successive generations of Chinese naval officers and sailors with modernization as the central theme and patterns of their operational behavior. The unique characteristics influence naval reforms amid political loyalty. The way the Chinese Navy both carried on longstanding traditions while made remarkable changes was crucial to building a "rich country with a strong navy."

Introduction: Chinese military strategy and operations -- From Taiwan to Chosin -- A deception with three problems -- Massed attack on the Marines -- Annihilate the U.S. 31st Regiment -- Failed roadblocks and pursuit -- Recovery and reengagement -- Conclusion: Lessons learned and the legacy of Chosin.

"The Chinese have a decades long history of aiding the Vietnamese through military training, strategic advising, and monetary means. As a communist state bordering Vietnam, China actively supported Ho Chi Minh's wars against France from 1950 - 1954 and against America from 1965 - 1970. Even after the signing of the Geneva Peace Agreement, China continued its military assistance to North Vietnam. Between 1955 and 1963, Chinese military aid to Ho totaled $106 million, including weapons and ammunition that armed more than one hundred infantry battalions, or about 80,000 men. The massive contributions to North Vietnam enabled Ho to build up a strong conventional force. After 1964, China increased its aid, and from 1964 to 1973, it provided approximately $20 billion more in military and economic aid to Vietnam. Among the Communist states, China was the largest supplier of war materials to North Vietnam until 1967, supplying about 44.8 percent of total military aid that year. In Building Ho's Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, Xiaobing Li assembles a detailed overview of Chinese military aid, training, and cooperation with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the 1950s and 60s. Western strategists and historians have long speculated about Chinese military assistance in the Vietnam War, but it was not until recently that newly available archival materials revealed the true extent of Chinese involvement. Li uses these new Communist sources in an unprecedented manner to offer a Chinese military perspective on the Vietnam War. This book builds upon previous scholarly efforts to add a better understanding of the ground-level contribution of China's effort to improve NVA combat effectiveness in the Vietnam War."

Introduction: understanding modern East Asia -- Part I. War and revolution -- Imperial powers and pre-WWII Japan -- The Asian-Pacific War (1937-1945) -- Cold War Japan: occupation and reform (1945-1951) -- The Nationalists vs. the Communists in China -- The People's Republic and Taiwan (1949-1957) -- Part II. The east vs. the west -- The Korean War (1950-1953) -- China and the First Indochina War -- New Japan (1952-1996) -- The Communist Cold War and Vietnam (1958-1975) -- Part III. From bi-polar, triangle, to global -- The Cultural Revolution and Sino-US Rapprochement -- China's reforming movement -- Two Koreas and the Sino-Vietnamese Border War -- Surviving the Cold War: China's globalization -- Conclusion: East Asia in the twenty-first century

"More than fifty years ago, the United States sent troops into Korea as part of a United Nations Command to check the North Korean invasion of South Korea. After repelling the invasion, the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and approached the Yalu River, the Chinese-North Korean border. Leaders of the People's Republic of China considered the UN action to be a challenge to the newly-established Communist regime and launched an invasion "to resist America and aid Korea." Between November 1950 and the end of the war in June 1953, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army launched six major offensives against the UN forces. The most important of these, the fifth, began on April 22, 1951, and was the greatest Communist military operation of the war, the largest battle since the end of World War II. The Chinese deployed more than 700,000 men, including 600,000 troops in 33 infantry and four artillery divisions. The engagement lasted more than five weeks. The UN forces put up a strong defense and stopped the Chinese short of the South Korean capital of Seoul. The Chinese never again came so close to Seoul. China's defeat in this battle forced Mao Zedong to reconsider his aims on the battlefield, and the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. Battle for Korea offers new perspectives on Chinese decision-making, planning, and execution; the roles of command, political control, and technology; and the interaction between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, and it provides valuable insight into Chinese military doctrine and the reasons for the UN's military success"--

The Chinese government has traditionally held positions on civil liberties that many nations of the world now view as repressive, although the origins of the nation's civil liberty policies are logically rooted in traditional Chinese ideology. Despite modern China's rapid growth and evolution in various areas, it may take another generation of leadership for substantial change in civil liberties to reach its society

Abstract
The Song dynasty established a standing naval force, which was ignored by some historians since Song lost its defensive wars to the Jin and Mongol forces. This article examines improvements and innovations of Chinese naval operations during Song and pays particular attention to how the state economic reforms and state-centered financial system supported naval development. Song's population growth and demographic changes also provided manpower for the government to maintain a huge army while establishing a large navy. As the new age of naval and siege warfare emerged, gunpowder weapons and new naval technology became more widespread. The Chinese military adapted to naval warfare during the Southern Song because it was economically and technologically possible. The south's mastery of riverine warfare created a substantial defensive advantage against the north. Thus, when the Mongols later mastered riverine warfare, they penetrated throughout the south.