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We investigate the influence of financial and political factors on peer-to-peer (P2P) platform failures in China's online lending market. Using a competing risk model for platform survival, we show that large platforms, platforms with listed firms as large shareholders, and platforms with better information disclosure were less likely to go bankrupt or run off (platform owners abscond with investor funds). More importantly, failing platforms were much less likely to run off in advance of major political events, but more likely to declare bankruptcy or run off after such events. These effects are more pronounced for politically connected platforms, platforms operating in provinces where local officials have close ties with central government, and in provinces with better local financial conditions. Our study highlights the role of political incentives on government regulatory intervention in platform failures.

AbstractHeightened geopolitical risk has become the new normal. We study the effects of geopolitical risks on cross‐border acquisition activity. Using military alliance to proxy for the degree of geopolitical risks, we find that the formation of military alliance between two countries is associated with greater cross‐border acquisition flows. Using the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargements as identification strategy, we find stronger effects of military alliance, especially with defense pacts. One important channel is that military alliance can substitute for target countries' institutional quality and minimize extreme geopolitical threats faced by acquirers. We find that countries with poor governance and weaker legal enforcement benefit more from military alliance, especially by receiving inbound acquisitions from major military powers. These findings highlight the role of military alliance in the global market for corporate control by reducing geopolitical risks.