Suchergebnisse

While numerous studies have demonstrated the difficulty minority opinion holders face when trying to persuade a majority, the present research investigated the conditions under which minority members might second-guess themselves and become advocates for the majority's position even when they have the best information. In a laboratory experiment, we examined whether the structure of monetary incentives (fixed amount vs. performance-based) and group decision-making procedure (collective decisions vs. group discussion then individual decisions) might mitigate second-guessing by minority members when they initially favor the objectively best choice. Our results indicated that compared with fixed-amount incentives, performance-based incentives increased overall information sharing in collective decision-making groups but not in individual decision-making groups. Second-guessing by minority members was most likely to occur in groups that received performance-based incentives and made decisions individually. As a result of second-guessing, these groups also made poorer decisions.

Social media can be a double-edged sword for political misinformation, either a conduit propagating false rumors through a large population or an effective tool to challenge misinformation. To understand this phenomenon, we tracked a comprehensive collection of political rumors on Twitter during the 2012 US presidential election campaign, analyzing a large set of rumor tweets ( n = 330,538). We found that Twitter helped rumor spreaders circulate false information within homophilous follower networks, but seldom functioned as a self-correcting marketplace of ideas. Rumor spreaders formed strong partisan structures in which core groups of users selectively transmitted negative rumors about opposing candidates. Yet, rumor rejecters neither formed a sizable community nor exhibited a partisan structure. While in general rumors resisted debunking by professional fact-checking sites (e.g. Snopes), this was less true of rumors originating with satirical sources.

Abstract
Many online systems for bilateral transactions elicit performance feedback from both transacting partners. Such bilateral feedback giving introduces strategic considerations. We focus on reciprocity in the giving of feedback: how prevalent a strategy of giving feedback is only if feedback is first received from one's trading partner. The overall level of feedback activity clearly depends on the prevalence of the reciprocation strategy: in a market with many reciprocators and few unconditional feedback providers, the equilibrium quantity of feedback can be quite low. We estimate the prevalence of such reciprocation in one market, eBay. Reciprocation cannot be directly distinguished from late feedback that was not conditioned on the partner having provided feedback. We develop a model that distinguishes the two by exploiting information about the timing of feedback provision when the partner does not provide feedback. We find that buyers and sellers on eBay used the "reciprocate only" strategy about 20-23% of the time. We also measure the extent to which the prevalence of these strategies changes with the experience levels of the two parties and with the item price.

Research on the wisdom of crowds (WOC) identifies two paradoxical effects of communication. The social influence effect hampers the WOC, whereas the collective learning effect improves crowd wisdom. Yet it remains unclear under what conditions such communication impedes or enhances collective wisdom. The current study examined two features characterizing communication in online communities, communication network centralization and shared task experience, and their effect on the WOC. Both these features can serve as indicators of the likelihood that underlying communication may facilitate either social influence or collective learning. With an 8-year longitudinal behavioral-trace data set of 269,871 participants and 1,971 crowds, we showed that communication network centralization negatively affected the WOC. By contrast, shared task experience positively predicted the WOC. Shared task experience also moderated the effect of communication network centralization such that centralized communication networks became more beneficial for crowd performance as shared task experience increased.