Suchergebnisse

Multi-agency financial stability committees (FSCs) have grown dramatically since the global financial crisis. However, most cannot direct actions or recommend to other agencies that they take actions, and most would influence policy actions only through convening and discussing risks. We evaluate whether the significant variation in FSCs and other financial regulatory structures across countries affect decisions to use the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB). After controlling for credit growth and the severity of the financial crisis, we find that countries with stronger FSCs are more likely to use the CCyB, especially relative to countries where a bank regulator or the central bank has the authority to set the CCyB. While the experience with the CCyB is still limited, these results are consistent with some countries creating FSCs with strong governance to take actions, but most countries instead creating weak FSCs without mechanisms to promote actions, consistent more with a symbolic political delegation motive and raising questions about accountability for financial stability.

Faced with the prospect of a new Great Depression in 2008 when the collapse of Lehman Brothers set off a global panic, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other agencies took extraordinary measures to contain the damage and steady the financial system and the economy. Edited by three of the policymakers who led the government's response to the crisis, with chapters written by the teams tasked with finding policy solutions, this book provides a comprehensive accounting of the internal debates and controversies surrounding the measures that were taken to stabilize the economy