Suchergebnisse

As firms from East Asia gain global market share they are stirring trade disputes with import-competing firms in the West. Jessica Liao analyzes the role played by government-business collaboration in determining how effective East Asian governments are in helping their exporters gain an edge over western competitors through WTO litigation.

The policies of Going Out and Good Neighbor have worked in tandem to direct Chinese diplomacy toward Southeast Asia over the past decades. This article asks how these policies have shaped Chinese energy and mining firms' business decisions in the region. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, this article argues that while Going Out and Good Neighbor have contributed to the growth of China's energy and mining development projects in Southeast Asia, this outcome is not merely the result of a state-directed initiative. The growth is also driven by Chinese state-owned firms that take advantage of Beijing's policy agenda and the institutional shortcomings behind it to plow state-backed resources into business partnerships with weak rule-of-law governments in the region. These partnerships and the associated projects are often touted as an arm of Chinese diplomacy, emboldening these firms to make risky expansion. Moreover, market, diplomatic, social, and geographic factors inherent to Southeast Asia further catalyze Chinese firms' risky business practices while at the same time Beijing, prioritizing diplomatic relations over good governance, has been slow to police problems stemming from its firms' dubious partnerships. In the end, this situation has hurt China's image, contrary to Good Neighbor's intended objectives. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Although China's use of the WTO dispute settlement system has increased, its legal actions remain less aggressive than those of other large economies. This article examines how China's subsidy policies make Chinese leaders reluctant to use WTO dispute settlement mechanisms in resolving trade disputes with other countries.

Hedging has been a widely discussed concept in explaining East Asian states' counteracting policies in the face of great power competition. However, the current literature has yet to specify how hedging responds to great power competition in economic statecraft, namely, using economic means to influence other states. This paper examines Vietnam's response to Japan and China's infrastructure financing programs over the past three decades. Through a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, it explains how Vietnam, while following economic pragmatism, does not simply aim to maximize gains from these two powers. Vietnam's decisions embody what we call economic hedging, or a cautious calculation over the linkage between security risks and infrastructure partnership and a tendency to pivot away from infrastructure partners deemed risky, namely, China. It also shows that such caution has intensified in the face of a nationalistic public that has challenged the notion of economic pragmatism, pushed a realist approach to economic relations with China, and bolstered Hanoi to take more action to protect Vietnamese sovereignty from Chinese economic influence. The convergence of these domestic and international trends have driven Hanoi to enhance collaboration with Japan, which it views as an increasingly important strategic partner. (Pac Rev/GIGA)