International law and civil wars: intervention and consent
In: Law, conflict and international relations
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In: Law, conflict and international relations
In: Law, Conflict and International Relations
This book examines the international law of forcible intervention in civil wars, in particular the role of party-consent in affecting the legality of such intervention. In modern international law, it is a near consensus that no state can use force against another - the main exceptions being self-defence and actions mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. However, one more potential exception exists: forcible intervention undertaken upon the invitation or consent of a government, seeking assistance in confronting armed opposition groups within its territory. Although the latter.
In: Law, conflict and international relations
In: European journal of international law, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 349-381
ISSN: 1464-3596
Abstract
Aggressor state A occupies territory belonging to victim state V. After decades, V decides to go to war to recover its territory, although hostilities have long subsided. Are such 'wars of recovery' lawful under international law? Should they be? Recent conflicts have generated a heated scholarly debate on this question, which has ended in stark disagreement. A permissive approach argues that wars of recovery are lawful instances of self-defence, while a restrictive view claims that situations of prolonged occupation are territorial disputes that should be settled peacefully. This article uncovers the theoretical premises that underlie both approaches. As it shows, the dilemma reflects a larger tension within the contemporary international law on the use of force – mainly, between its traditional focus on state rights such as territory and sovereignty and a competing view that seeks to place individual rights at the core of the legal regime. As the article shows, deciding on the question of wars of recovery requires making commitments in four normative spheres: instrumentally, it requires considering questions of international stability, and, non-instrumentally, it requires considering questions of justice as well as possible justifications for killing and sacrifice. These considerations, however, result in instability owing, among other factors, to the fluctuating effects of the passage of time, which follow our normative assumptions about the legal order. Ultimately, the article suggests that those engaging in debate on wars of recovery make explicit their normative assumptions on the ends of jus ad bellum and that, in any case, even if wars of recovery would be deemed legal, they would still remain heavily contestable owing to strong competing reasons against them.
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In: Harvard International Law Journal, Band 65, Heft 2
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In: Forthcoming in Eyal Benvenisti & Dino Kritsiotis (eds), Cambridge History of International Law (Vol. XII): International Law Since the End of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press)
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In: European journal of international law, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 579-612
ISSN: 1464-3596
Abstract
In its recent General Comment no. 36 (GC 36), the Human Rights Committee (HRC) engaged for the first time, in a substantial manner, with the relations between the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the right to life. This article uses the HRC's position on these relations as a platform for a long-needed discussion on the theoretical underpinnings, and implications, of a possible human rights law on the resort to force between states. This article identifies and conceptualizes three pillars in GC 36's position, which subject traditional questions of jus ad bellum to international human rights law considerations: first, the view that aggression is not only a violation of jus ad bellum but also that the killings it entails are ipso facto violations of the right to life, even in cases where these killings would be lawful under the laws of armed conflict (jus in bello); second, that states bear the 'responsibility' to oppose aggression as a matter of human rights; and, third, that a state's failure to reasonably attempt to resolve disputes peacefully could amount to a violation of the duty to ensure the right to life of its people. The article analyses these pillars doctrinally and then moves to discuss the theoretical commitments required to accept each of them as well as their costs. Namely, they all require breaking with the traditional view that jus ad bellum is strictly an interstate issue. Although, as the article argues, this development is based on sound ethical premises, the humanization of jus ad bellum through human rights law carries risks that should not be overlooked: chiefly, the securitization of human rights and the depoliticization of war. The prospects and perils of the humanization of jus ad bellum, as this article demonstrates, open a new area of theoretical inquiry and legal possibilities.
In: 32 European Journal of International Law 579 (;2021);
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Working paper
In: 62 Harvard International Law Journal Online (2021)
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In: 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (2020)
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In: Rethinking the Crime of Aggression: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives 97 ( Stefanie Bock and Eckart Conze eds., Springer, 2021)
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Working paper
In: European journal of international law, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 843-876
ISSN: 1464-3596
Abstract
In late 1956, the United Nations (UN) faced a remarkable test, as the Soviet Union invaded and crushed a burgeoning rebellion in Hungary, then a Soviet satellite. After the Soviet Union disregarded repeated UN calls to withdraw, the UN General Assembly established, in January 1957, a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the crisis. This article explores the forgotten story of the Special Committee on Hungary as a case study for the effects of COIs. This commission is of special interest for several reasons. Namely, it was one of the first mandated by a UN body to investigate a specific conflict, not least a Cold War struggle, in which a superpower was directly involved. Furthermore, it was clear from the beginning that the Committee was not likely to compel, in itself, the Soviet Union to change its behaviour. Moreover, 1956 was a time of global political transformation, as the non-aligned movement emerged as a key player in UN politics and, accordingly, became a target in the Cold War battle for influence. Under such circumstances, the effects of COIs are complex and difficult to gauge. While the Committee did not lead to the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Hungary, it had many unforeseen and conflicting effects. These are grouped into two categories – effects relating mainly to times of ideological conflict and political transformation and effects that relate to parallel multilateral efforts and institutional dynamics. Among other effects, the article demonstrates how, under such political circumstances, COIs can create new points of contention and cause backlash precisely from those that they seek to influence. Having cascading and conflicting effects, the central conclusion is that COIs do not lend themselves easily to clean and linear theories. Recognition of the field's inherent complexity is therefore needed in any attempt to study this international phenomenon.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 113, Heft 3, S. 664-669
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: European journal of international law, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 321-340
ISSN: 1464-3596