Suchergebnisse

Lieske has recently developed a new measure of state culture that appears to be a much better predictor of state performance than other commonly used measures including per capita income, Sharkansky's index of Elazar's typology, and Hero's index of racial and ethnic diversity. Here, we show why uni- and multi-dimensional reductions of Elazar's and Lieske's typologies and other measures do not predict and explain the variation in representative indicators of state performance nearly as well. To lay the groundwork for a more rigorous understanding of state culture, and to integrate it with the work of Hero on diversity and Putnam on social capital, we also develop and test an evolutionary theory that draws on Marger's theory of ethnic competition and Vanhanen's theory of ethnic nepotism. Adapted from the source document.

This study analyzes changes in the regional subcultures of the United States using 2000 census and religious survey data. The results suggest a remarkable degree of continuity with those the authors identified in an earlier study. In addition, they demonstrate that a new multidimensional measure of state culture does a much better job in predicting social and political behavior than other frequently used indicators. Finally, they show how their new measure of state culture significantly reduces and often eliminates the problem of spatial autocorrelation in many state-level indicators that cannot be explained by differences in economic development and racial-ethnic diversity. Adapted from the source document.

This study analyzes changes in the regional subcultures of the United States using 2000 census and religious survey data. The results suggest a remarkable degree of continuity with those the authors identified in an earlier study. In addition, they demonstrate that a new multidimensional measure of state culture does a much better job in predicting social and political behavior than other frequently used indicators. Finally, they show how their new measure of state culture significantly reduces and often eliminates the problem of spatial autocorrelation in many state-level indicators that cannot be explained by differences in economic development and racial—ethnic diversity.

Examines social structure and regional ethnic and religious patterns and their effect on the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections.

How do you explain the outcomes of modern presidential elections? This is the central dilemma of American politics. Why, for instance, did the Democrats, the so-called majority party, lose again in 1988? And why have they gone down to defeat in five of the last six presidential elections? Curiously, there appears to be no dearth of answers to these questions.Many pundits, such as neoconservative William Schneider (1988), have argued that the Democrats are too liberal to win a national election. Others maintain that presidential elections are retrospective referenda on the economy and peace issues. According to this view, the incumbent party never loses when times are prosperous and the nation is at peace. Still others argue that presidential elections are actually beauty contests in which voters select the candidate who demonstrates the most attractive combination of personality traits, leadership qualities, and political credentials (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Yet others contend that most losing Democratic candidates have run notoriously inept campaigns. In the Yiddish vernacular, Dukakis was a "Putz." Finally, some analysts (Burns, Peltason, and Cronin 1989: 276–77) try to please everyone by advancing umbrella explanations that include all of these arguments.Unfortunately, none of these explanations, taken individually, is particularly persuasive. And most appear to be little more than post hoc rationalizations. Of course, when something cannot be fully understood, we are prone to make fun of our ignorance.

Analyzes data from the 1970 census for 243 areas. Tests the effects of racial dualism, economic development, and political culture.