Claire Lim discussion of: EU exit and UK trade
In: Economic policy, Band 38, Heft 116, S. 767-768
ISSN: 1468-0327
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In: Economic policy, Band 38, Heft 116, S. 767-768
ISSN: 1468-0327
In: Economic policy, Band 38, Heft 113, S. 193-194
ISSN: 1468-0327
In: American economic review, Band 103, Heft 4, S. 1360-1397
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence critically depends on payoffs from the job, which implies that the effectiveness of election may vary substantially across public offices. Third, reelection incentives may discourage judges with significant human capital from holding office. (JEL D72, K41)
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15675
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w18355
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Working paper
In: Annual Review of Economics, Band 13, S. 87-109
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 126, Heft 1, S. 263-312
ISSN: 1537-534X
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Working paper