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Abstract If Saudi Arabia's regional strategy involves the containment of Iran's proxies, why, under King Salman, did Saudi Arabia attack the Houthis in Yemen, but give up its attempt to overthrow Bashar al-Assad in Syria? I argue here that both decisions reflect Mohammed bin Salman's willingness to seek 'heterodox' solutions in foreign policy, a feature that guided Saudi foreign policy in the face of a changing decision-making unit in the Saudi regime. While MBS's influence in the case of Yemen is more easily identified, in the case of Syria this is not so straightforward. The crown prince only acquired the ability to manoeuvre Saudi policy towards Syria after consolidating his power within the regime, in 2017, and, from there, he put in place measures that, in practice, facilitated a coexistence arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Russia. In both cases, the objective was to contain the perceived Iranian advances in a scenario of reduced appetite by the United States to provide security for Saudi Arabia. This conclusion is reached through the use of a Foreign Policy Analysis approach, more specifically, the analysis of the decision-making units, to broaden and deepen the observations made from a regime security perspective.

Between 2016 and 2020, a group of activist generals successfully plotted the Brazilian military's gradual return to the political center stage with powers unseen since the dictatorship. They achieved this without formally breaking the law, suspending the democratic process or overthrowing the government. We call this a "stealth intervention," an incremental yet systematic attempt to redesign politics without causing a rupture, that fits neither in the existing typology of coups nor in the literature on democratic backsliding. We argue that Brazil's stealth intervention, built upon the military's existing tutelary prerogatives and driven by an unreformed praetorian worldview that resurfaced amidst a sustained crisis of democracy, challenges the prevalent view of the armed forces as a reactive force that intervenes in civilian politics only when its institutional interests are threatened. Finally, we show that democratic backsliding in Brazil started under Bolsonaro's predecessor, Michel Temer, and point to the generals' understudied role in this process. (JPLA/GIGA)

Between 2016 and 2020, a group of activist generals successfully plotted the Brazilian military's gradual return to the political center stage with powers unseen since the dictatorship. They achieved this without formally breaking the law, suspending the democratic process or overthrowing the government. We call this a "stealth intervention," an incremental yet systematic attempt to redesign politics without causing a rupture, that fits neither in the existing typology of coups nor in the literature on democratic backsliding. We argue that Brazil's stealth intervention, built upon the military's existing tutelary prerogatives and driven by an unreformed praetorian worldview that resurfaced amidst a sustained crisis of democracy, challenges the prevalent view of the armed forces as a reactive force that intervenes in civilian politics only when its institutional interests are threatened. Finally, we show that democratic backsliding in Brazil started under Bolsonaro's predecessor, Michel Temer, and point to the generals' understudied role in this process.

Résumé Cet article vise à présenter les principales caractéristiques d'une cellule de renseignements financiers (CRF), analyser les divers modèles existants ainsi que les problèmes liés à cette diversité structurelle, examiner la question de l'échange d'informations entre les cellules et enfin, proposer la mise en place d'une Agence européenne anti-blanchiment pour améliorer la coopération entre les CRF au sein de l'Union européenne, ayant comme modèle l'Agence européenne de gestion de frontières Frontex. Les efforts déployés pour mettre au point des stratégies efficaces de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux réunissent plusieurs aspects distincts mais connexes des systèmes financiers et du droit pénal. La CRF - ou Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) en anglais - est une composante fondamentale de ces stratégies. Il est essentiel, pour l'intégrité des systèmes financiers, de lutter contre les délits de blanchiment de capitaux mais, si l'on veut que ces efforts soient couronnés de succès, les méthodes répressives classiques doivent recevoir l'appui du système financier lui-même, en particulier par l'application des principes de connaissance de la clientèle et par la déclaration des opérations suspectes à une CRF 1 . Les CRF existent aujourd'hui depuis plus de quinze ans, et une centaine d'entre elles ont été admises dans le Groupe Egmont, l'association informelle des CRF 2 .

One of the most serious problems troubling the European Union is the evolution of cross-border crimes and, in particular, international terrorism and organised crime. National law enforcement authorities cannot fight cross-border crimes efficiently if their efforts are made solely on a national level. Since the early 1990s, the (European) political authorities have become increasingly aware of this problem and have taken steps to facilitate the participation of the law enforcement and other relevant personnel from other state(s) in investigating offences. This has resulted in the adoption of a vast number of documents and new instruments (eg the European Arrest Warrant), and the creation of new agencies within the European Union, the aim of which is to facilitate cross-border activities to fight cross-border crimes.