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Based on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Alexandre Kojève produces a theory of an "anthropogenesis" that allocates the constitution of self-consciousness in a markedly historical and social field centered on the "dialectic of the master and the slave". More than this, it emerges in a domaine seized by the conflictuality of such a central operator of socialization, namely the desire, which is always, in the last case, a desire for recognition. Aware of this idea and on the path of the development of an imaginary's theory, Lacan was pursuing the necessity to reallocate certain points of the Freudian constitution's theory of the ego. He was aiming to bypass Freud's supposed "biologism" (especially in his theory of the "death drive") by emphasizing the fundamental dependence of the other's figure on the process of "hominization", in which "aggressiveness" plays an inherent role. If the projects of Kojève and Lacan present undeniable convergences, it is necessary, however, to better understand them, as well as to establish the uniqueness of their distances, inflections and objectives.

The purpose of this article is to follow a precise period of the trajectory of the experience of consciousness in Hegelian philosophy. It was chosen the subsection "sense-certainty or this or the aiming" of the Phenomenology of Spirit as standpoint. In a first moment, the aspects that Hegel calls "natural conscience", based on his "immediate knowledge" are underscored. Since such perspective, it is analyzed the cognitive-instrumental relationship between consciousness and the object of consciousness, notably when the object is considered essential, namely, as "This". In as much as it is targeted, the "This" reveals itself as an "This-here-now" as something that carries itself its negation, that is, the "this" has the role of a mediation process anchored in the universality contained in the particularity. This notion of universal imposes on the "immediate conscience" a set of premises that it could not accept under the risk of being mischaracterized. The main aspect amid them concerns the impossibility of saying what its object is and, therefore, aspiring to constitute itself as knowledge. Finally, it is highlighted that the failure of this first form of knowledge that calls itself a "certainty" exposes the pedagogical character of the dialectical procedure developed in the Phenomenology of the Spirit: the consciousness improves itself with its own illusions, losing itself under the immanence of its experiences, its failures and the process of overcoming, upon on the act of experiencing.