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Cumulative Voting: Investor Protection or Antitakeover? Evidence from Family Firms in China
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 234-248
ISSN: 1467-8683
AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThe Chinese government regulates on the adoption of cumulative voting (CV) in order to protect minority shareholders by allowing them to elect a dissident director. However, adopting CV may deter potential acquirers, reducing the effectiveness of corporate takeover as a governance mechanism. Even worse, lacking enforcement of CV adoption allows firms to adopt CV when they need to deter potential acquirers.Research Findings/InsightsFirst, we find CV adopters have better governance overall, but also have tightened control such as higher ownership concentration. This evidence hints that when a firm adopts better governance to signal the market, it may tighten control in other ways such as increasing shareholder power and adopting CV. Second, we distinguish the role of CV in investor protection by examining its competing effects on tunneling and antitakeover. We find that CV does not reduce tunneling but lowers the probability of CEO turnover and of the firm becoming a takeover target. These results indicate that CV is used as an antitakeover measure in family‐controlled listed companies. Finally, we find that adopting CV has no impact on company performance.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur evidence sheds light on the incentives embedded in the ownership structure that can determine the governance mechanism in family firms.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsSince 2002, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission requires firms with a controlling shareholder holding more than 30 percent of shares to adopt CV. Our study shows that this policy has unintended consequences and does not always protect minority shareholders.
Stock Price Informativeness and Idiosyncratic Return Volatility in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China
In: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 1450025
ISSN: 1793-6705
This study attempts to address two research questions on the idiosyncratic return volatility and stock price informativeness. First, whether idiosyncratic return volatility is a valid proxy for stock price informativeness in emerging markets, and if it is, whether there exists a monotonic relationship between the idiosyncratic return volatility and stock price informativeness throughout the whole sample. We find that the idiosyncratic return volatility reflects the stock price informativeness in China. However, such a relationship does not exist in a monotonic fashion. These results indicate that idiosyncratic return volatility serves as an information measure, but must be used with caution.
What's in It for Me? CEOs' Rent-Seeking Motivations and Corporate Social Responsibility Decisions
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 123-147
ISSN: 1558-8025
ABSTRACT
Prior research has argued that companies in transition economies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to achieve political goals, such as building connections with the government. However, it is unclear why chief executive officers (CEOs) agree to make these politically driven CSR decisions that mainly benefit the controlling shareholders. We show that controlling shareholders may "bribe" the CEOs with greater compensation or perks—a form of economic rents extracted by the CEOs—to make CSR decisions, and such a pattern is more salient in local government-owned companies. We reason that these CSR activities reflect implicit contracting between the controlling shareholders and the CEOs. Through cross-section analyses, we find that the CEO's economic rents vary with local government fiscal needs, the firm's governance structure, and CEO power. Furthermore, we demonstrate that increases in CSR-linked compensation lead to a decline in shareholder value.
Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper.
JEL Classifications: D72; M12; P26.
Blockchain and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Supply Chain
In: British Accounting Review, Forthcoming
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