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AbstractInternational regulators use data on systemic importance for additional capital requirements for banks with cross‐jurisdictional operations. Chinese banks' importance scores have risen significantly and China stands as the world's largest net creditor. Furthermore, commercial banks in China have recorded higher non‐performing loans ratios across 2013–2015. Tracking systemic risk is a core activity in enabling macroprudential regulation. We focus on Chinese commercial banks and rank them as domestic systemically important banks (D‐SIBs). We then identify those high ranking D‐SIBs that are also global systemically important banks (G‐SIBs). We investigate whether high ranking D‐SIB/G‐SIB banks have adequate capital and their interconnectedness.

This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level in China. We employ the panel data model as a platform for empirical analysis and control for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion, and that the provincial-level public sector is characterized by economies of scale. This study also documents that Wagner's law does not hold true for China. Moreover, both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization contribute to the expansion of China's government. Adapted from the source document.