Suchergebnisse

In the two decades since the United States became the world's only superpower, policymakers in Washington have seemingly abandoned many tools of statecraft and instead now rely on U.S. military strength as the key--and sometimes the sole--element of its.

In the late 1980s, Japan's strong economic performance put it on a the verge of becoming a major player in regional and global affairs. But nearly a decade of economic stagnation, a mounting of bad debts, and a continuing stream of scandals have tarnished the country's distinctive economic model. At the turn of the millennium, the Japanese economy remained mired in a pattern of stagnation. As this disappointing condition dragged on, the government pursued policies to restore economic health. Yet Japan has been slow to embrace the systemic reform on which a robust economic recovery depends. In Arthritic Japan, Edward J. Lincoln examines the causes and implications of this weak response. Concluding that Japan is unlikely to pursue the vigorous reform necessary for economic growth, Lincoln warns of serious consequences: a stumbling economy bedeviled by recession and financial crisis, eroding leadership in economic and security issues, a continued defensive trade posture, and a disgruntled population that could turn a more nationalistic stance in foreign policy.

In this book, Edward J. Lincoln tackles the thorny issue of U.S. trade relations with Japan, the subject of so much tension in the 1990s. In so doing, he builds on his earlier Brookings book, Japan's Unequal Trade. Lincoln argues that statistical evidence shows only modest progress in diminishing Japan's "distinctiveness." Despite an upturn in the mid-1990s, import penetration, intra-industry trade, and inward foreign direct investment all remain low relative to most other nations. High profile negotiating efforts by both the Bush and Clinton administrations made progress in chipping away at protectionist barriers but fundamental problems remain. While Lincoln offers suggestions on what needs to be done by both sides, the most important lesson drawn from recent experience is that expectations should be lowered. Any feasible approach to making markets more open in Japan is likely to yield slow progress. Such realism--not to be confused with defeatism--is the only approach that has any chance of realizing gains over time.

"While Lincoln offers suggestions on what needs to be done by both sides, the most important lesson drawn from recent experience is that expectations should be lowered. Any feasible approach to making markets more open in Japan is likely to yield slow progress. Such realism - not to be confused with defeatism - is the only approach that has any chance of realizing gains over time."--Jacket

Since 1980, Japan's international economic position has undergone a historic transformation that is now having significant consequences for Japan, the United States, Europe, and other countries around the world. In this book, Edward J. Lincoln analyzes the major economic changes that occurred in Japan during the 1980s, including macroeconomic shifts, financial deregulation, yen appreciation, rising labor costs brought on by long-term demographic changes, and technological success. Since 1945, the Japanese have shied away from active involvement in most of the complications and problems of the international community. Now, however, a surge in outward foreign investment, particularly direct investment, has involved the nation, more intimately with the outside world than in the past. As a result, Japan has had to cope with some difficult new questions: how to participate meaningfully in the work of the major multilateral economic institutions and the United Nations, how to expand or change the country's foreign aid program, how to take part in the intentional debate on environmental policy, and how deeply to become involved in solving the world's political problems. Lincoln asserts that overcoming the string of insularity and passivism for the years since 1945 will not be easy. He proposes several specific policies that would lead Japan toward a more productive international engagement and suggests that these changes will also serve the objectives of American foreign policy. The 1993 elections and the new coalition government in Japan offer a greater possibility of domestic change; the mood of the nation has shifted away from continued acceptance of the policies of the past. There is now a greater opportunity for the American government to engage in a productive dialogue that can encourage Japan toward a more open and active global role.

With all the rapid economic success in Japan, it is easy to forget just how insular the nation has been, and how strikingly different its trading patterns remain from those of other industrialized nations. Japan is moving into an era of greater interaction with the world, but Lincoln contends that this does not mean the United States and other nations can end their pressure on Japan to continue opening its markets. "Now is the time to bring Japan into the fold," Lincoln writes in his introduction. Lincoln focuses on the question of access to Japanese markets, Japan's pattern of trade on imports, and the consequences of large trade and current-account imbalances. He argues against the United States abandoning its free-trade ideal and offers suggestions for applying pressure to encourage greater real access to Japanese markets.

Japan is the great economic success story of the postwar period, growing at unprecedented rates to become one of the world's most advanced industrial nations. But since the early 1970s, Asia's economic giant has had to contend with many of the problems encountered by Western economies--slower growth, increased unemployment, rapid changes in the financial and industrial sectors--problems that have permanently transformed its economy and pose crucial challenges for its leaders. In this book, Edward J. Lincoln discusses Japan's burst of growth and the complex interplay of demographic, cultural, economic, and political forces that shaped the subsequent emergence of large domestic imbalances. The motivation and impact of Tokyo's successive attempts to deal with slower growth receive special attention: ballooning government deficits that supported domestic growth in the late 1970s, a determined switch to austerity measures in the 1980s as a surging current-account surplus conveniently buoyed the economy, and as yet uncertain responses to the recent appreciation of the yen that has capped the external surpluses. Lincoln focuses on the changes experienced by Japan's financial institutions and their implications for international economic transactions. Slower growth and altered monetary flows have brought increasing domestic and international pressures for deregulating financial institutions, and the government has responded cautiously. The study analyzes the resulting tensions and crosscurrents within Japan and the strains that have developed in relations with the United States. It concludes with a lucid presentation of Japan's options for stimulating domestic demand through reducing private-sector savings, increasing investment, and raising government spending, as well as appropriate U.S. policies to promote these outcomes. Whatever policy decisions

Japan, like many countries, has long offered savings deposits through the postal system. That system has undergone some reform over the past dozen years, and beginning in 2007 the system was to undergo privatization, with Japan Post Bank eventually becoming an independent entity. A new law passed in 2012 has stalled the privatization process. Regardless of how the issue of privatization plays out, the existence of a savings bank embedded within the postal system raises a number of troubling issues. This essay addresses five of those problems: a level playing field, market power, cross subsidization, social policy, and risk or inefficiency. These issues concern the fairness of competition within the banking industry, future financial stability of the Japan Post Bank, and broader economic inefficiency within the Japanese economy. This essay argues that government ownership of Japan Post Bank is unjustified on economic or social grounds. Complete privatization should resolve some of the problems, especially that of a level playing field. But issues of economic inefficiency and future financial stability could remain even after privatization.

Japan Post Insurance is the largest insurance company in Japan - indeed, in the world when measured by assets ($1.1 trillion in March 2013). Beyond the market power of sheer size, government ownership results in undue benefits because it enables inappropriate cross-subsidization, results in inefficiency and heightened risk, and violates international principles of national treatment for foreign firms participating in the domestic market. In short, government ownership raises issues of a tilted playing field. Further, economic theory provides no justification for the existence of Japan Post Insurance (JPI) as a government-owned institution. The obvious conclusion is that JPI needs to be completely privatized in both form and substance. That is, not only should the government-owned Japan Post Holdings sell all shares of JPI to the public, the rules and regulations pertaining to the privatized firm should be identical to those for the rest of the insurance industry. If JPI is not privatized, then the government should regulate it in a manner that avoids the distortions analyzed in this paper.