Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes. By Maiah Jaskoski. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 322p. $55.00
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 508-509
ISSN: 1541-0986
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In: Perspectives on politics, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 508-509
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 295-305
ISSN: 0959-2318
World Affairs Online
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 295-305
ISSN: 1743-9558
In: Armed forces & society: official journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society : an interdisciplinary journal, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 381-398
ISSN: 0095-327X
World Affairs Online
In: Armed forces & society, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 381-398
ISSN: 1556-0848
An increase in the use of private military and security contractors over the last two decades has sparked a debate over whether their employment enhances or detracts from government control of its security agents. Although there is a rich literature on civilian control of military agents, there is still disagreement on the operationalization of control, and there has been little attempt to apply these theories to private actors. This article contributes to both discussions by offering a synthesis of theories of control and comparing features specific to public versus private agents that may affect control. The author offers the hypothesis that the principles of democratic governance are likely to be more secure when policy is carried out by public agents. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]
In: Armed forces & society, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 381-398
ISSN: 1556-0848
An increase in the use of private military and security contractors over the last two decades has sparked a debate over whether their employment enhances or detracts from government control of its security agents. Although there is a rich literature on civilian control of military agents, there is still disagreement on the operationalization of control, and there has been little attempt to apply these theories to private actors. This article contributes to both discussions by offering a synthesis of theories of control and comparing features specific to public versus private agents that may affect control. The author offers the hypothesis that the principles of democratic governance are likely to be more secure when policy is carried out by public agents.
In: Armed forces & society: official journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society : an interdisciplinary journal, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 608-611
ISSN: 0095-327X
In: Armed forces & society, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 608-611
ISSN: 1556-0848
In: Internationale Politik: das Magazin für globales Denken, Heft 1, S. 40-44
ISSN: 1430-175X
World Affairs Online
In: Internationale Politik: IP ; Deutschlands führende außenpolitische Zeitschrift, Band 63, Heft 1, S. 40-44
ISSN: 2627-5481
"Wenn es um Aufstandsbekämpfung im Irak geht, ist auch hierzulande oft die Rede von 'Counter-insurgency'. Eine exakte deutsche Entsprechung fehlt, und wer den Begriff kennt, assoziiert ihn mit dem Vietnam-Krieg. Beides trägt eher zur Verwirrung über die amerikanische Strategie im Nahen und Mittleren Osten bei. Ein Klärungsversuch." (Autorenreferat)
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 508-509
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: History of political thought, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 657-681
ISSN: 0143-781X
In: Armed forces & society, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 436-458
ISSN: 1556-0848
Economic studies of military manpower systems emphasize the advantages of voluntarism under all but the most total threats, but this explains neither the persistence of institutionalized conscription in many states nor the timing of shifts from such conscription systems to volunteer militaries. Traditional explanations focus on external threat levels, but this has also proven unsatisfying. We theorize that threat variables establish the state's baseline need for manpower, but structural economic variables determine whether the necessary manpower can be more efficiently obtained by conscription or voluntarism. Using a new data set of 99 countries over 40 years, we find that states with British origins are less likely and those experiencing greater external threat are more likely to employ conscripts. Most importantly, states with more highly regulated labor markets are more likely to employ conscripts, which suggests that, controlling for a number of relevant factors, labor markets matter in military manpower decisions.
World Affairs Online
In: Armed forces & society, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 436-458
ISSN: 1556-0848
Economic studies of military manpower systems emphasize the advantages of voluntarism under all but the most total threats, but this explains neither the persistence of institutionalized conscription in many states nor the timing of shifts from such conscription systems to volunteer militaries. Traditional explanations focus on external threat levels, but this has also proven unsatisfying. We theorize that threat variables establish the state's baseline need for manpower, but structural economic variables determine whether the necessary manpower can be more efficiently obtained by conscription or voluntarism. Using a new data set of 99 countries over 40 years, we find that states with British origins are less likely and those experiencing greater external threat are more likely to employ conscripts. Most importantly, states with more highly regulated labor markets are more likely to employ conscripts, which suggests that, controlling for a number of relevant factors, labor markets matter in military manpower decisions.
In: Les champs de Mars: revue d'études sur la guerre et la paix, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 333-339
ISSN: 2427-3244