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Contemporary research on the international diffusion of civil conflict privileges physical, proximity-based variables like conflict spillover and refugee flows. I argue that the international diffusion of civil strife can occur through a learning mechanism, and that this phenomenon may occur on a worldwide basis. Individuals most likely to rebel, or proto-rebels, may learn about the utility of rebellion before mobilizing and violently challenging the state. Such international learning therefore occurs during the pre-conflict process. International sources by which proto-rebels learn include active, ongoing civil wars, as well as revolutionary governments that have been founded by rebels victorious in past wars. Revolutionary governments radically shock the international system, teaching proto-rebels about the possible benefits to be gained from violently challenging the state. In order to test these assertions, I undertake empirical analyses using militant organization data that capture the year in which rebel movements first emerge, during the period 1968–2001. I then explore the spatial and temporal relationships between rebel movement emergence, civil conflict, and revolutionary regimes, using the country-year as my unit of analysis. I further examine how these relationships are attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. I find, in line with the literature, that active civil conflicts generally inspire rebel mobilization only in directly neighboring states, while revolutionary regimes established after rebel victories are associated with mobilization on a global basis. I conclude that proto-rebels learn and take inspiration from some global sources of information, and that significant analytical utility is to be gained by focusing on revolutionary regimes established as a result of rebel victories, as well as mobilization in the pre-conflict process.

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch's (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders' desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.

Proponents of democratization often claim that liberal institutions have a palliative effect on the level of conflict within societies. Critics, however, suggest that the instruments of democracy, especially elections, can spark political violence, particularly in weakly institutionalized settings. Using the newly available Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), we examine the relationship between executive elections and social conflict in Africa for the period 1990-2009. We also assess the conditions which make elections more or less violent. We examine elections in (1) countries faced with armed conflict, (2) post-conflict settings, (3) elections in autocracies, and (4) in relatively poor countries. We also look at characteristics of elections themselves, including the margin of victory, the presence of observers, and allegations of vote fraud. Results show that while elections can sometimes spark violence, free and fair elections in genuinely democratic contexts are much less conflict prone, while illiberal elections are especially problematic. We do not find that current or recent armed conflict on a country's territory makes elections more violent. Adapted from the source document.