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Most believe that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame on that account when it comes from a hypocritical blamer. This book examines the nature and ethics of standingless hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame by virtue of their lack of commitment to the norms to which they appeal in their blame.

Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.

"While it has many connections to other topics in normative and applied ethics, discrimination is a central subject in philosophy in its own right. It plays a significant role in relation to many real-life complaints about unjust treatment or unjust inequalities, and it raises a number of questions in political and moral philosophy, and in legal theory. Some of these questions include: what distinguishes the concept of discrimination from the concept of differential treatment? What distinguishes direct from indirect discrimination? Is discrimination always morally wrong? What makes discrimination wrong? How should we eliminate the effects of discrimination? By covering a wide range of topics, and by doing so in a way that does not assume prior acquaintance, this handbook enables the reader to get to grips with the omnipresent issue.The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook is divided into six main parts: conceptual issues ;the wrongness of discrimination; groups of 'discriminatees'; sites of discrimination; causes and means; history of discrimination.Essential reading for students and researchers in applied ethics and political philosophy the handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as law, sociology and politics.?"--Provided by publisher.

FC -- Half title -- Bloomsbury Ethics -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- 1 Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What is luck egalitarianism? -- 1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism? -- 1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin -- 1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson -- 1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen -- 1.7 Other distributive views -- 1.8 Summary -- 2 Why equality? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formal equality -- 2.3 Equality of human beings -- 2.4 Williams on the idea of equality -- 2.5 Rawls on range properties -- 2.6 Respect and opaqueness -- 2.7 A different proposal -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Luck -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Different kinds of luck -- 3.3 Thin luck -- 3.4 Thick luck -- 3.5 Independent notions of luck -- 3.6 How much luck is there? -- 3.7 Constitutive luck -- 3.8 Option luck versus brute luck -- 3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality -- 3.10 Bad luck versus good luck -- 3.11 Summary -- 4 Equality of what? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Welfare -- 4.3 The specification objection -- 4.4 The disability objection -- 4.5 The offensive preference objection -- 4.6 The expensive and snobbish tastes objections -- 4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection -- 4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view -- 4.9 Sen's capability metric -- 4.10 Summary -- 5 Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Some distinctions -- 5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality -- 5.4 The levelling down objection -- 5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.7 Egalitarian responses -- 5.8 Summary -- 6 The scope of luck egalitarianism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Whole lives -- 6.3 Generations.

This text addresses these three issues: What is discrimination? What makes it wrong?; What should be done about wrongful discrimination? It argues that there are different concepts of discrimination; that discrimination is not always morally wrong and that when it is, it is so primarily because of its harmful effects

This text addresses these three issues: What is discrimination? What makes it wrong?; What should be done about wrongful discrimination? It argues that there are different concepts of discrimination; that discrimination is not always morally wrong and that when it is, it is so primarily because of its harmful effects.

Mange mener, at indirekte diskrimination i sig selv er uretfærdig, fordi den på disproportional vis stiller bestemte grupper værre. I denne artikel rejser jeg to spørgsmål: 1) Hvad vil det sige at stille en gruppe værre, og 2) hvilke grupper er det relevant at interessere sig for, når vi stiller spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en given praksis er indirekte diskriminerende? Jeg viser, at det er vanskeligt at besvare de to spørgsmål på en måde, der både indfanger den måde, vi normalt tænker om indirekte diskrimination på og samtidig indebærer, at indirekte diskrimination er uforenelig med de moralske hensyn, der begrunder det synspunkt, at indirekte diskrimination er moralsk problematisk. I den sidste del af artiklen forklarer jeg, hvorfor der ikke følger af artiklens negative konklusion – at indirekte diskrimination ikke i sig selv er uretfærdig – at vi skal undlade at mindske eller forbyde indirekte diskrimination.

Many believe that indirect discrimination is unjust as such, because, by definition, it involves the imposition of disproportionate disadvantages on the group of discriminatees. In this article I ask two questions: 1) What does it take to disadvantage a group, and 2) which groups are relevant for the purpose of determining whether a given practice is indirectly discriminatory? I argue that it is difficult to answer these two questions in a way that aligns both with the way in which we normally think about indirect discrimination and the view that indirect discrimination necessarily clashes with the moral concerns that we normally think render indirect discrimination morally objectionable. In the last part of the article, I explain why the article's negative main claim – that indirect discrimination is not unjust in itself – does not entail that we should refrain from reducing or prohibiting indirect discrimination.