Public reason and political community
In: Bloomsbury research in political philosophy
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In: Bloomsbury research in political philosophy
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 177-197
ISSN: 1467-9760
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 84, Heft 3, S. 1528-1538
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 209-228
ISSN: 1741-3060
This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason for mandatory participation in social insurance, it will not justify the generous (if conditional) income support egalitarians favour. To sustain the objection, we need to think of reciprocity a limit on duties of assistance and fair-sharing. In this form, the objection resists the inherited assets response, which holds that we can't have a duty reciprocate benefits we receive from nature or from previous generations.
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 860-861
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 151-172
ISSN: 2194-5624
AbstractJason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle's index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizinglong runincome growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn't benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 47-69
ISSN: 1741-3060
This article traces John Rawls's debt to Frank Knight's critique of the 'just deserts' rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary criticisms, but also to argue that desert can find a place within a Rawlsian theory of justice when desert is grounded in reciprocity. The first lesson Rawls took from Knight was that inheritance of talent and wealth are on a moral par. Knight highlighted the inconsistency of objecting to the inheritance of wealth while taking for granted the legitimacy of unequal reward based on differential productive capacity. Rawls agreed that there was an inconsistency, but claimed that it should be resolved by rejecting both kinds of inequality, except to the extent they benefitted the worst off. The second lesson Rawls learned from Knight was that the size of one's marginal product depends on supply and demand, which depend on institutional decisions that cannot themselves be made on the basis of the principle of rewarding marginal productivity. The article claims that this argument about background justice overstates its conclusion, because the dependence of contribution on institutional setup is not total. Proposals for an unconditional basic income may therefore have a strike against them, as far as a reciprocity-based conception of desert is concerned. If we follow Knight's analysis of the competitive system, however, so too does the alternative of leaving determination of income up to the market.
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 155-172
ISSN: 1467-9760
Liberalism Without Perfection elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment to public justifiability does not rule out all perfectionism, if there are some claims about the good that are not reasonably rejectable.
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In: The journal of political philosophy
ISSN: 0963-8016
In: Filozofija i društvo, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 12-34
ISSN: 2334-8577
Liberalism Without Perfection elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of
public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This
critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of
the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons
for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if
one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment to
public justifiability does not rule out all perfectionism, if there are some
claims about the good that are not reasonably rejectable.
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 25, Heft 3-4, S. 409-444
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 316-326
ISSN: 1474-8851
In: Critical review: an interdisciplinary journal of politics and society, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 409-444
ISSN: 0891-3811
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 316-326
ISSN: 1741-2730