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This collection of essays by David Little addresses human rights in relation to the historical settings in which its language was drafted and adopted. Featuring five original essays, Little articulates his view that fascist practices before and during World War II vivified the wrongfulness of deliberately inflicting severe pain, injury, and destruction for self-serving purposes and that the human rights corpus, developed in response, was designed to outlaw all practices of arbitrary force. He contends that while there must be an accountable human rights standard, it should guarantee latitude for the expression and practice of beliefs, consistent with outlawing arbitrary force. Little details the theoretical grounds of the relationship between religion and human rights, and concludes with essays on US policy and the restraint of force in regard to terrorism. With a foreword by John Kelsey, this book is a capstone of the work of this influential writer on religion, philosophy, and law

This article applauds the recent rise of scholarly attention to studying the relation of religion to natural rights in general and Calvinism in particular. Against the strong belief in some quarters that appeals to nature, including the idea of rights, do not play a significant role in Calvin's thought, the article concurs with recent (and some not so recent) work to the contrary, arguing that such appeals do occupy an important, if ambiguous, place for Calvin. However, the article resists explaining the variations in his thought as the result of changing interpretations over time. Rather, it is contended that these matters were a source of tension throughout Calvin's career. He struggled not so much with the question of the natural knowledge of rights, but of the ability to choose to act on that knowledge. In conclusion, the article hints that Calvin's ambivalence on this issue sowed the seeds for significant divergence among his descendants. Adapted from the source document.

Explores the notion of Just Peace, demonstrating the validity of three propositions. First, the implications of religion for the topic are significant & intricate: significant due to religion's vital role in today's international system & vital because religions at times differ in their doctrinal understandings of justice & peace. Second, the concept of Just Peace should be regarded as a rubric, an "umbrella term" that encompasses a host of sub-problems. Third, despite the complexity of the issues at hand, the enduring significance of internationally acknowledged human rights constitute one major unifying theme for the diverse considerations of peace & justice. K. Coddon

In "transitional societies" like South Africa and Bosnia, which are currently moving from authoritarianism, and often violent repression, to democracy, questions arise about the appropriate way to deal with serious human rights offenders. Will a system of retributive justice bring about the healing and harmony necessary for peace and stability? Or, is "a different kind of justice" required, one explicitly aimed at reconciliation, and designed to repair and restore relations, and, perhaps, to forgive offenders rather than prosecute them? Are the systems mutually exclusive, or can they be combined in some way?In an effort to clarify terms and sharpen practical choices, this essay distinguishes between retributive and restorative justice and relates the distinction to constructive proposals concerning the ideas of forgiveness and reconciliation. The essay then applies the proposed framework to two recent efforts to cope with the problem: the truth and reconciliation commissions of South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Learner autonomy is classically defined as "the ability to take charge of one's learning" (Holec 1981:3). Such an ability presupposes a positive attitude towards the process, content and goals of learning, and is sustained and strengthened by a developing capacity for "detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and independent action" (little 1991:4). The freedom that characterizes the autonomous learner is not absolute, but conditional and constrained. Learning, whether developmental/ experiential or formal, is always embedded in an interactive, social process (self- instruction entails an internalization of this process, so that our capacity for learning on our own develops out of our experience of learning in interaction with others; cf. Uttle 1991:5). This explains the paradox that learner autonomy can be fully understood as a theoretical construct and effectively pursued as a pedagogical goal only when we take full account of the social context in which learning takes place. The argument in favour of fostering learner autonomy has been conducted in both social and psychological terms. In adult education, for example, there has been a tendency to stress "the need to develop the individual's freedom by developing those abilities which will enable him to act more responsibly in running the affairs of the society in which he lives" (Holec 1981:1.). The link between educational purpose and political ideal could scarcely be plainer. Other explorations of the theory and practice of learner autonomy, by contrast, have focussed on the psychological dimension of learning, emphasizing that we can only ever learn on the basis of what we already know, and that no two individuals have exactly the same store of knowledge. ; peer-reviewed