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Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- INTRODUCTION: Us versus Them: America and Islam in the Age of Terror -- CHAPTER ONE: Genesis: Containment and Cold War in the Muslim World -- CHAPTER TWO: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War: "Beyond Containment" in the Middle East -- CHAPTER THREE: Bill Clinton and the Middle East: From "Enlargement" to "Dual Containment" -- CHAPTER FOUR: Containment on Steroids? George W. Bush and Rogue State Rollback -- CHAPTER FIVE: The Obama Doctrine: "Contagement" and Counterterrorism in the Muslim World -- CHAPTER SIX: Revelations: Islamophobia, the Green Threat, and a New Cold War in the Middle East? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- A Note on Further Reading and Historical Sources -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

In this important new book, Douglas Little explores the political and cultural turmoil that led U.S. policy makers to shift their attention from containing the "Red Threat" of international communism to combating the "Green Threat" of radical Islam after 1989. Little analyzes America's confrontation with Islamic extremism through the traditional ideological framework of "us versus them" that has historically pitted the United States against Native Americans, Mexicans, Asian immigrants, Nazis, and the Soviets. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to signal that the doctrine of containment had served U.S. interests in the Middle East well, preserving Western access to Persian Gulf oil while protecting Israel and preventing communist subversion. Yet, although many Americans hoped that the end of the Cold War would enable the United States to redefine its diplomatic relationships in the Middle East and elsewhere, Little demonstrates that from Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to America's battle against ISIS today, U.S. foreign policy has been governed by "us versus them" thinking, with Islamophobia supplanting the threats of yesteryear.

Little explores the stormy American relationship with the Middle East from World War II through the war in Iraq, focusing particularly on the complex and often inconsistent attitudes and interests that helped put the United States on a collision course with radical Islam early in the new millennium. After documenting the persistence of "orientalist" stereotypes in American popular culture, Little examines oil, Israel, and other aspects of U.S. policy. For this updated third edition, Little covers events through 2007, including a new chapter on the Bush Doctrine, demonstrating that in

Little explores the stormy American relationship with the Middle East from World War II through the war in Iraq, focusing particularly on the complex and often inconsistent attitudes and interests that helped put the United States on a collision course with radical Islam early in the new millennium. After documenting the persistence of "orientalist" stereotypes in American popular culture, Little examines oil, Israel, and other aspects of U.S. policy. For this updated third edition, Little covers events through 2007, including a new chapter on the Bush Doctrine, demonstrating that in.

In a prolonged quest for independence after 1945, Kurdish nationalists reportedly sought help from U.S. officials who viewed the Kurdish issue through a Cold War prism and who regarded the Kurds as querulous mountain tribes useful primarily in keeping the Soviet Union and its Arab clients off balance. Recently declassified documents shed new light on three key episodes in this story: first, the secret encouragement provided by Washington to Kurds opposed to Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim, who tilted toward Moscow after seizing power in 1958; second, the covert action launched by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in Iraqi Kurdistan after Saddam Hussein allied himself with the USSR in 1972; and third, the half-hearted U.S. attempts to foment regime change in Iraq in the early 1990s. In each case, the U.S. government stirred up anti-Arab resentments among the Kurds, helped ignite an insurrection, and then pulled the plug when events spiraled out of control. U.S. duplicity plus Kurdish factionalism equaled tragedy in the mountains of Kurdistan.

In a prolonged quest for independence after 1945, Kurdish nationalists reportedly sought help from U.S. officials who viewed the Kurdish issue through a Cold War prism and who regarded the Kurds as querulous mountain tribes useful primarily in keeping the Soviet Union and its Arab clients off balance. Recently declassified documents shed new light on three key episodes in this story: first, the secret encouragement provided by Washington to Kurds opposed to Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim, who tilted toward Moscow after seizing power in 1958; second, the covert action launched by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in Iraqi Kurdistan after Saddam Hussein allied himself with the USSR in 1972; and third, the half-hearted U.S. attempts to foment regime change in Iraq in the early 1990s. In each case, the U.S. government stirred up anti-Arab resentments among the Kurds, helped ignite an insurrection, and then pulled the plug when events spiraled out of control. U.S. duplicity plus Kurdish factionalism equaled tragedy in the mountains of Kurdistan. Adapted from the source document.