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Why do "ordinary" people engage in collective violence, harming others on behalf of their group? In this article, we argue that the violent group itself, and the identity it bestows on participating members, is an often overlooked and yet fundamental source of motivation for an individual's participation in collective violence. Reviewing insights from social and moral psychology, military history, and public health, we outline how the psychology of individual violent behavior presents a puzzle. For an ordinary person, participation in violence is often an aversive and distressing experience, and yet violent behavior leads to more violence in the future. A better understanding of the dynamics of collective violence allows us to make sense of this paradox. Violent groups can promote violent behavior among members by increasing members' motivation to engage in violence, particularly through group identification and deliberate strategies, and by removing psychological obstacles to violence (i.e., by making violence less aversive). Our synthesis of the literature points to a cycle of individuals' participation in collective violence, in which group identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with violent groups.

Why do 'ordinary' people engage in collective violence, harming others on behalf of their group? In this article, we argue that the violent group itself, and the identity it bestows on participating members, is an often overlooked and yet fundamental source of motivation for an individual's participation in collective violence. Reviewing insights from social and moral psychology, military history, and public health, we outline how the psychology of individual violent behavior presents a puzzle. For an ordinary person, participation in violence is often an aversive and distressing experience, and yet violent behavior leads to more violence in the future. A better understanding of the dynamics of collective violence allows us to make sense of this paradox. Violent groups can promote violent behavior among members by increasing members' motivation to engage in violence, particularly through group identification and deliberate strategies, and by removing psychological obstacles to violence (i.e., by making violence less aversive). Our synthesis of the literature points to a cycle of individuals' participation in collective violence, in which group identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with violent groups. Adapted from the source document.

Reducing prejudice through intergroup contact interventions / Rebecca Littman, Alexandra Scacco, and Chagai Weiss -- Redrawing the boundaries : creating positive intergroup relations interventions through shared values, memberships, and identities / Danielle Blaylock, Rhiannon N. Turner, and Richard J. Crisp -- Empathy and perspective-taking interventions in intergroup contexts : catalysts, caveats, and contraindications / Jacquie D. Vorauer and Corey Petsnik -- Using social norms to promote positive relations between social groups / Sohad Murrar and Markus Brauer -- Diversity training is just teaching / Calvin K. Lai, R. Grace Drake, and Jennifer F. Beatty -- Self-affirmation and intergroup biases : changing the narrative and the potential for conflict reduction / David K. Sherman, W. Connor Gibbs, and Kevin R. Binning -- Malleability interventions in intergroup relations / Smadar Cohen-Chen, Amit Goldenberg, James J. Gross, and Eran Halperin -- Using intergroup emotion regulation interventions to reduce intergroup conflict / Tamar Avichail, Maya Tamir, James Gross, and Eran Halperin -- Paradoxical thinking interventions in intergroup conflicts : a promising method to affect cognitions and behavior among people with strongly held attitudes / Shira Hebel-Sela, Nadine Knab, and Boaz Hameiri -- Interventions based on moral exemplars / Marta Witkowska, Michal Bilewicz, and Sabina Čehajić-Clancy -- The power of correcting meta-perceptions for improving intergroup relationships / Samantha L. Moore-Berg -- School-based interventions to improve intergroup relations from early childhood to adolescence / Dearbháile Counihan and Laura K. Taylor -- Promoting peace through mass media interventions / Rebecca Littman, Rezarta Bilali, and Boaz Hameiri -- Improving intergroup relations through interactive media / Béatrice S. Hasler, Yiftach Ron, and Patrice L. (Tamar) Weiss.

Numerous empirical studies of the relationship between popular support for Islamism and support for democracy and violence have yielded inconclusive results. We suspect that this is largely because scholars have not operationalized support for Shari`a in ways that capture the concept's multi-dimensionality. In this paper, we employ data derived from a carefully designed survey instrument that casts unique insights into how Pakistanis imagine a Shari`a-based government. We find that formalizing an Islamic government as one that implements Shari`a by providing services and security for its citizens is positively associated with support for democratic values, whereas conceptualizing it as one that implements Shari`a by imposing hudud punishments and restricting women's public roles is positively associated with support for militancy. These results suggest that it is important to understand how individuals within a particular context construe a Shari`a-based government, and future empirical work should take this.

Challenging conventional wisdom, previous research in South Asia and the Middle East has shown that poverty and exposure to violence are negatively correlated with support for militant organizations. Existing studies, however, provide evidence consistent with two potential mechanisms underlying these relationships: (1) the direct effects of poverty and violence on attitudes toward militant groups and (2) the psychological effects of perceptions of poverty and violence on attitudes. Isolating whether the psychological mechanism is an important one is critical for building theories of mass responses to political violence. We conducted a series of original, large-scale survey experiments in Pakistan (n=16,279) in which we randomly manipulated perceptions of both poverty and violence before measuring support for militant organizations. We find evidence that psychological perceptions do in part explain why the poor seem to be less supportive of militant political groups.

Has there been meaningful movement toward open sci-ence practices within the social sciences in recent years? Discussions about changes in practices such as posting data and pre-registering analyses have been marked by controversy—including controversy over the extent to which change has taken place. This study, based on the State of Social Science (3S) Survey, provides the first com-prehensive assessment of awareness of, attitudes towards, perceived norms regarding, and adoption of open science practices within a broadly representative sample of scholars from four major social science disciplines: economics, political science, psychology, and so-ciology. We observe a steep increase in adoption: as of 2017, over 80% of scholars had used at least one such practice, rising from one quarter a decade earlier. Attitudes toward research transpar-ency are on average similar between older and younger scholars, but the pace of change di˙ers by field and methodology. According with theories of normal science and scientific change, the timing of increases in adoption coincides with technological innovations and institutional policies. Patterns are consistent with most scholars underestimating the trend toward open science in their discipline.

The reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups is a pressing policy challenge. Governments and policymakers often have to change minds among reticent populations and shift perceived community norms in order to pave the way for peaceful reintegration. How can they do so on a mass scale? Previous research shows that messages from trusted authorities can be effective in creating attitude change and shifting perceptions of social norms. In this study, we test whether messages from religious leaders-trusted authorities in many communities worldwide-can change minds and shift norms around an issue related to conflict resolution: the reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups. Our study takes place in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the birthplace of the violent extremist group Boko Haram. Participants were randomly assigned to listen to either a placebo radio message or to a treatment message from a religious leader emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, announcing the leaders forgiveness of repentant fighters, and calling on followers to forgive. Participants were then asked about their attitudes, intended behaviors, and perceptions of social norms surrounding the reintegration of an ex-Boko Haram fighter. The religious leader message significantly increased support for reintegration and willingness to interact with the ex-fighter in social, political, and economic life (8 to 10 percentage points). It also shifted peoples beliefs that others in their community were more supportive of reintegration (6 to 10 percentage points). Our findings suggest that trusted authorities such as religious leaders can be effective messengers for promoting peace.

The reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups is a pressing policy challenge. Governments and policymakers often have to change minds among reticent populations and shift perceived community norms in order to pave the way for peaceful reintegration. How can they do so on a mass scale? Previous research shows that messages from trusted authorities can be effective in creating attitude change and shifting perceptions of social norms. In this study, we test whether messages from religious leaders—trusted authorities in many communities worldwide—can change minds and shift norms around an issue related to conflict resolution: the reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups. Our study takes place in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the birthplace of the violent extremist group Boko Haram. Participants were randomly assigned to listen to either a placebo radio message or to a treatment message from a religious leader emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, announcing the leader's forgiveness of repentant fighters, and calling on followers to forgive. Participants were then asked about their attitudes, intended behaviors, and perceptions of social norms surrounding the reintegration of an ex–Boko Haram fighter. The religious leader message significantly increased support for reintegration and willingness to interact with the ex-fighter in social, political, and economic life (8 to 10 percentage points). It also shifted people's beliefs that others in their community were more supportive of reintegration (6 to 10 percentage points). Our findings suggest that trusted authorities such as religious leaders can be effective messengers for promoting peace.

The reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups is a pressing policy challenge. Governments and policymakers often have to change minds among reticent populations and shift perceived community norms in order to pave the way for peaceful reintegration. How can they do so on a mass scale? Previous research shows that messages from trusted authorities can be effective in creating attitude change and shifting perceptions of social norms. In this study, we test whether messages from religious leaders-trusted authorities in many communities worldwide-can change minds and shift norms around an issue related to conflict resolution: the reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups. Our study takes place in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the birthplace of the violent extremist group Boko Haram. Participants were randomly assigned to listen to either a placebo radio message or to a treatment message from a religious leader emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, announcing the leader's forgiveness of repentant fighters, and calling on followers to forgive. Participants were then asked about their attitudes, intended behaviors, and perceptions of social norms surrounding the reintegration of an ex-Boko Haram fighter. The religious leader message significantly increased support for reintegration and willingness to interact with the ex-fighter in social, political, and economic life (8 to 10 percentage points). It also shifted people's beliefs that others in their community were more supportive of reintegration (6 to 10 percentage points). Our findings suggest that trusted authorities such as religious leaders can be effective messengers for promoting peace.

Widespread acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines is crucial for achieving sufficient immunization coverage to end the global pandemic, yet few studies have investigated COVID-19 vaccination attitudes in lower-income countries, where large-scale vaccination is just beginning. We analyze COVID-19 vaccine acceptance across 15 survey samples covering 10 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in Asia, Africa and South America, Russia (an upper-middle-income country) and the United States, including a total of 44,260 individuals. We find considerably higher willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine in our LMIC samples (mean 80.3%; median 78%; range 30.1 percentage points) compared with the United States (mean 64.6%) and Russia (mean 30.4%). Vaccine acceptance in LMICs is primarily explained by an interest in personal protection against COVID-19, while concern about side effects is the most common reason for hesitancy. Health workers are the most trusted sources of guidance about COVID-19 vaccines. Evidence from this sample of LMICs suggests that prioritizing vaccine distribution to the Global South should yield high returns in advancing global immunization coverage. Vaccination campaigns should focus on translating the high levels of stated acceptance into actual uptake. Messages highlighting vaccine efficacy and safety, delivered by healthcare workers, could be effective for addressing any remaining hesitancy in the analyzed LMICs.

Widespread acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines is crucial for achieving sufficient immunization coverage to end the global pandemic, yet few studies have investigated COVID-19 vaccination attitudes in lower-income countries, where large-scale vaccination is just beginning. We analyze COVID-19 vaccine acceptance across 15 survey samples covering 10 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in Asia, Africa and South America, Russia (an upper-middle-income country) and the United States, including a total of 44,260 individuals. We find considerably higher willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine in our LMIC samples (mean 80.3%; median 78%; range 30.1 percentage points) compared with the United States (mean 64.6%) and Russia (mean 30.4%). Vaccine acceptance in LMICs is primarily explained by an interest in personal protection against COVID-19, while concern about side effects is the most common reason for hesitancy. Health workers are the most trusted sources of guidance about COVID-19 vaccines. Evidence from this sample of LMICs suggests that prioritizing vaccine distribution to the Global South should yield high returns in advancing global immunization coverage. Vaccination campaigns should focus on translating the high levels of stated acceptance into actual uptake. Messages highlighting vaccine efficacy and safety, delivered by healthcare workers, could be effective for addressing any remaining hesitancy in the analyzed LMICs.