Suchergebnisse

The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia's present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China's quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US' vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing's balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the 'new Cold War' narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

In response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia, both China and the United States attempt to alter the regional order in their own favour, both in the economic and security realms. This article shows how diverging views on future arrangements are leading to strategic shifts and increasing tension between these two Great Powers. As part of its quest for Great-Power status, China has been actively pushing its regional initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as adopting assertive security policies towards its neighbours. In contrast, in order to counter China's growing influence America's regional strategy is undergoing a subtle shift from 'rebalancing to Asia' to focusing on the 'Indo-Pacific' region. However, amid an intensifying trade war and other challenges facing the region, China has chosen to moderate its proactive foreign policy-orientation in the past few years. In particular, China has made attempts to downplay its domestic rhetoric, rebuild strategic relationship with India and Japan, and to reassure ASEAN states in the South China Sea. In response to the Indo-Pacific strategy, it would be more effective for China to articulate a more inclusive regional vision and promote an institutional framework that also accommodates a US presence in the region.

After the end of the Cold War, East Asia did not enter a period fraught with tension and conflict, but surprisingly maintained a relatively long period of peace. The existing literature on the East Asian security order mainly emphasizes structural or processual factors, but these approaches cannot provide an adequate explanation of the interior dynamics and mechanisms of the East Asian security order. The main reasons for the inherent instability in the current system are still unclear. In this paper, the author presents a functionalist explanation and argues that the United States and China's separate provision of the two most important public goods-security expectations and economic benefits-laid the foundation for the current security order in East Asia. However, with the rise of China and the U.S. pivot toward Asia, supplying these two types of regional public goods becomes more difficult than it was previously, and this new scenario will cause instability in the existing order. (Issues Stud/GIGA)

Purpose
The purpose of this study is to conduct an empirical investigation into the impact of supply chain dependence (including customer dependence and supplier dependence) on credit risk through the lens of social network theory (SNT) by focusing on how to manage firm risk using supply chain relationships in the context of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).


Design/methodology/approach
Using data from public databases, this study selects a unique sample from a Chinese SME board and uses an ordered logistic regression model to investigate the relationship between the dependence on major customers or suppliers and both credit risk and credit rating. It is found that the results are robust to the use of different empirical methods.


Findings
The main findings of this study are that a firm's dependence on major customers is positively related to its credit risk but negatively related to its credit rating, while a firm's dependence on major suppliers is positively related to its credit risk but negatively related to its credit rating.


Originality/value
To broaden the understanding of industrial marketing and purchasing, this study contributes to research on supply chain relationship management and risk management by focusing on SMEs' dependence on major customers and suppliers and empirically examining the influence of this dependence on both credit risk and credit rating in an emerging market.

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.