Suchergebnisse

EU legal studies suffer from a disconnect with social reality. If we need a method, it is one that allows us to reconnect with European societies as a bustle of unsettled forms of life, from both an existential and social perspective. Departing from classic institutional and constitutional approaches to EU law, while endorsing the critical turn in the EU legal studies, I will argue in favour of a new "anti-transcendental" perspective.

The allocation of powers between the European Union and its member states is a classic theme in European studies. The question of to how to limit the expansion of Union's competences whilst safeguarding the dynamics of the process of European integration is now being raised. This book is a theoretical and practical inquiry into this question.

In a recent Article published in this Journal, Gareth Davies draws a parallel between European citizens as fashioned by EU law and pre-war Europe's Jews (G. Davies, How Citizenship Divides: The New Legal Class of Transnational Europeans, in European Papers, Vol. 4, 2019, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 675 et seq.). This parallel raises two serious issues. One is the complete lack of contextualisation of such a dubious comparison. The other is the lack of careful methodological engagement with the ways in which EU law operates in actual practice. This note cautions against the use of such parallels and calls for the development of renewed categories to analyse and critically assess the European Union and its law.

In a recent Article published in this Journal, Gareth Davies draws a parallel between European citizens as fashioned by EU law and pre-war Europe's Jews (G. Davies, How Citizenship Divides: The New Legal Class of Transnational Europeans, in European Papers, Vol. 4, 2019, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 675 et seq.). This parallel raises two serious issues. One is the complete lack of contextualisation of such a dubious comparison. The other is the lack of careful methodological engagement with the ways in which EU law operates in actual practice. This note cautions against the use of such parallels and calls for the development of renewed categories to analyse and critically assess the European Union and its law.

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

L'essentiel du travail des juristes européens sur la question de l'immigration se présente comme une réflexion sur les mécanismes mis en place par l'Union européenne et ses États membres pour réguler l'afflux de migrants(1). Il leur est aisé de constater que ces mécanismes fonctionnent mal. Ils se donnent dès lors pour tâche de trouver des remèdes. Recherche qui se résout généralement par l'établissement d'une formule associant responsabilité et solidarité. La responsabilité consiste, pour les États membres, à respecter à la lettre les règles relatives aux contrôles des personnes franchissant les frontières extérieures de l'Union et d'assumer les charges que leur impose le régime d'asile européen commun. La solidarité, c'est de pouvoir compter sur un partage entre États membres des coûts liés à la prise en charge des nouveaux arrivants et sur la mise en place d'une répartition équilibrée des nouveaux arrivants sur le territoire européen. La formule idéale veut que des comportements plus responsables entraîneront une solidarité plus forte. Force est toutefois de constater que tous les gouvernements européens n'adhèrent pas à cette formule : certains refusent la responsabilité, d'autres rejettent la solidarité. Au demeurant, dans l'autre grand domaine de crise mettant en cause l'Union européenne - l'euro -, où la même formule est proposée, de fortes résistances se font également entendre(2). Dans ce cas, responsabilité veut dire respect des règles portant sur la discipline budgétaire, tandis que la solidarité porte, pour l'essentiel, sur des mécanismes de transferts financiers entre États membres de l'Union. (Premier paragraphe de l'article)

L'essentiel du travail des juristes européens sur la question de l'immigration se présente comme une réflexion sur les mécanismes mis en place par l'Union européenne et ses États membres pour réguler l'afflux de migrants(1). Il leur est aisé de constater que ces mécanismes fonctionnent mal. Ils se donnent dès lors pour tâche de trouver des remèdes. Recherche qui se résout généralement par l'établissement d'une formule associant responsabilité et solidarité. La responsabilité consiste, pour les États membres, à respecter à la lettre les règles relatives aux contrôles des personnes franchissant les frontières extérieures de l'Union et d'assumer les charges que leur impose le régime d'asile européen commun. La solidarité, c'est de pouvoir compter sur un partage entre États membres des coûts liés à la prise en charge des nouveaux arrivants et sur la mise en place d'une répartition équilibrée des nouveaux arrivants sur le territoire européen. La formule idéale veut que des comportements plus responsables entraîneront une solidarité plus forte. Force est toutefois de constater que tous les gouvernements européens n'adhèrent pas à cette formule : certains refusent la responsabilité, d'autres rejettent la solidarité. Au demeurant, dans l'autre grand domaine de crise mettant en cause l'Union européenne - l'euro -, où la même formule est proposée, de fortes résistances se font également entendre(2). Dans ce cas, responsabilité veut dire respect des règles portant sur la discipline budgétaire, tandis que la solidarité porte, pour l'essentiel, sur des mécanismes de transferts financiers entre États membres de l'Union. (Premier paragraphe de l'article)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)