Suchergebnisse

Second image reversed plus a second image -- Liberal contenders and Britain's grand strategy of cooperation, 1889-1912 -- Imperial contenders and Britain's grand strategy of restrained punishment, 1932-1939 -- Imperial contenders and Spain's grand strategy of punishment, 1621-1640 -- Great power tenure

Theories of balancing are under assault. On theoretical and historical grounds, realists and non-realists challenge the claim that states balance against shifts in aggregate material capabilities. In addressing these claims, this article presents a more granular and finely tuned theory of balancing. It contends that states do, in fact, balance effectively. While foreign policy leaders regularly ignore aggregate power developments, they do disaggregate power to identify threatening states and target their balancing against specific threatening elements. Targeted-balancing theory explains why some historical cases coded as under-balancing are really instances of appropriate balancing; why a more powerful state's military buildup, or alliance formation against a weaker state, can constitute balancing; and why some instances of non- or missing-balancing against a more powerful state do not undermine balance-of-power theory. I provide support for my claims through an analysis of Britain's balancing against Germany and Italy between 1936 and 1939. Rather than under-balancing, or failing to balance altogether, London target-balanced against the specific threatening elements of German and Italian power. Given that power is rarely fungible across elements, London ranked other components of their power as secondary, and even last, in terms of Britain's rearmament priorities.

This article discusses the international environment for China, Russia and the US, which can range from permissive to restrictive for each state. It develops a domestic political economy model and argues that a great power can use concessions or hardline policies to concentrate benefits or losses on particular constituencies and thereby affect the domestic balance of political and economic power in great powers abroad. The final section discusses how between 1969 and 1979, Washington, Beijing and Moscow sought to win friends and influence enemies in the other two states. Adapted from the source document.

"Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism" published on by Oxford University Press.