Suchergebnisse

The problem of water overallocation in many regions of the world involves how to include environmental flow provisions for long-term sustainability of river systems, especially under scarce supply conditions. Market mechanisms have provided pathways for returning water to rivers for environmental use. We argue that it is important to consider how both market mechanisms and initial water allocation models contribute to achieving satisfactory environmental flow outcomes. The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) in Australia has had policy processes applied to it for almost twenty years to address these issues, and provides an excellent basis for case-study analysis. Two MDB case studies are used to consider differences in the interpretation and implementation of environmental flow requirements, and the potential for institutional inertia of the systems within which water markets operate. We identify two simplified models from these case studies—one prioritising environmental rights above consumptive extraction and the other prioritising consumptive and environmental rights equally. However, neither of these case-study models provides the full environmental flow spectrum of base in-stream flows to over-bank flush events. Our findings suggest that combining allocation and market-based rights (a third model) offers an effective means to deliver full-spectrum environmental flows. If governments provide prioritised environmental rights for base in-stream ecosystem benefits, together with targeted temporary and permanent water market acquisitions to meet environmental needs associated with over-bank floods and flushes, there will be lower potential for shortfalls relative to targeted environmental flow outcomes.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for both assessing the role of economic instruments, and reshaping them in order to enhance their contribution to the goals of managing water scarcity. Water management problems stem from the mismatch between a multitude of individual decisions, on the one hand, and the current and projected status of water resources on the other. Economics can provide valuable incentives that drive individual decisions, and can design efficient instruments to address water governance problems in a context of conflicting interests and relevant transaction costs. Yet, instruments such as water pricing or trading are mostly based on general principles of welfare economics that are not readily applicable to assets as complex as water. A flaw in welfare economic approaches lies in the presumption that economic instruments may be good orbad on their own (e.g., finding the "right" price). This vision changes radically when we focus on the problem, instead of the instrument. In this paper, we examine how economic instruments to achieve welfare-enhancing water resource outcomes can realize their full potential in basin-scale management contexts. We follow a political economy perspective that views conflicts between public and private interest as the main instrumental challenge of water management. Our analysis allows us to better understand the critical importance of economic instruments for reconciling individual actions towards collective ambitions of water efficiency, equity and sustainability with lessons for later-adopting jurisdictions. Rather than providing panaceas, the successful design and implementation of economic instruments as key river basin management arrangements involves high transaction costs, wide institutional changes and collective action at different levels.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for both assessing the role of economic instruments, and reshaping them in order to enhance their contribution to the goals of managing water scarcity. Water management problems stem from the mismatch between a multitude of individual decisions, on the one hand, and the current and projected status of water resources on the other. Economics can provide valuable incentives that drive individual decisions, and can design efficient instruments to address water governance problems in a context of conflicting interests and relevant transaction costs. Yet, instruments such as water pricing or trading are mostly based on general principles of welfare economics that are not readily applicable to assets as complex as water. A flaw in welfare economic approaches lies in the presumption that economic instruments may be good or bad on their own (e.g., finding the "right" price). This vision changes radically when we focus on the problem, instead of the instrument. In this paper, we examine how economic instruments to achieve welfare-enhancing water resource outcomes can realize their full potential in basin-scale management contexts. We follow a political economy perspective that views conflicts between public and private interest as the main instrumental challenge of water management. Our analysis allows us to better understand the critical importance of economic instruments for reconciling individual actions towards collective ambitions of water efficiency, equity and sustainability with lessons for later-adopting jurisdictions. Rather than providing panaceas, the successful design and implementation of economic instruments as key river basin management arrangements involves high transaction costs, wide institutional changes and collective action at different levels.