Suchergebnisse

Reviews the role of Canada, along with several of the smaller allied countries, in working in the 1960s to make the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a source of multilateral East-West detente. Ottawa shared the vision that NATO could transition from an organization of military defense into an organization working for peace. While serving as Canadian prime minister, Lester B. Pearson, who assisted in the formation of NATO, worked for peaceful accommodation between the USSR & Western countries. While the US was embroiled in Vietnam, Europe was involved in economic growth, & France was practicing obstructionism, Canada, with Belgium, Italy, & Norway, worked within NATO to create a forum for East-West deliberations. The adoption of the Harmel report in 1967 was a step toward that pursuit. L. A. Hoffman

Introduction: De Gaulle and Gaullism in France's Cold War foreign policy / Mark Kramer -- De Gaulle, French diplomacy, and Franco-Soviet relations as seen from Moscow / Marie-Pierre Rey -- A "cordial potentiality?" : de Gaulle and the Franco-German partnership, 1963-1969 / Carine Germond -- From words to actions : reinterpreting de Gaulle's European policy / Piers Ludlow -- NATO strategies toward de Gaulle's France, 1958-1966 : learning to cope / Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist -- Dealing with de Gaulle : the United States and France / Carolyn Davidson -- Britain, de Gaulle's NATO policies, and Anglo-French rivalry, 1963-1967 / James Ellison -- The U.S. escalation in Vietnam and de Gaulle's secret search for peace, 1964-1966 / Yuko Torikata -- Seeking a multipolar world : China and de Gaulle's France / Qiang Zhai -- A hot summer : France, Israel, and the Middle East crisis in 1958 / Gadi Heimann -- "Je ne vous ai pas compris" : de Gaulle's decade of negotiation with the Algerian FLN, 1958-1969 / Jeffrey James Byrne -- De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa : from decolonization to French development policy, 1958-1963 / Guia Migani -- The hero on the Latin American scene / Joaquín Fermandois -- Conclusion: A Gaullist grand strategy? / Garret Martin

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the "revisionist" conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the "revisionist" conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests-a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries. Adapted from the source document.