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International audience ; What is the status of "design" in nanotechnology? On the one hand, scientists doing nanotechnology refer to their activity as "design." On the other, the intervention of design researchers and practitioners remains confined to "the future" (i.e. societal applications and uses of nanotechnology). How are we to understand such a division of labour? To be sure it is not specific to nanotechnology but concerns the status of design in contemporary technoscience at large. However, the problem is more acute in the case of this "invisible" technology. Nanotechnology is supposed to be cut off from all sensible experience whereas design traditionally focuses on the shaping of the user's experience. After articulating the diagnosis and its implications, I question the status of a third player: "nano-art." I then draw on some resources of French philosophy of technology and aesthetics to prompt a new alliance between "technology" (the study of technics) and aesthetics (the study of sensation) resulting in a re-conceptualization of design as "techno-aesthetics." The chapter closes by highlighting the political significance of such techno-aesthetic design for nanotechnology and beyond, for our everyday live amidst technoscientific objects.

International audience ; What is the status of "design" in nanotechnology? On the one hand, scientists doing nanotechnology refer to their activity as "design." On the other, the intervention of design researchers and practitioners remains confined to "the future" (i.e. societal applications and uses of nanotechnology). How are we to understand such a division of labour? To be sure it is not specific to nanotechnology but concerns the status of design in contemporary technoscience at large. However, the problem is more acute in the case of this "invisible" technology. Nanotechnology is supposed to be cut off from all sensible experience whereas design traditionally focuses on the shaping of the user's experience. After articulating the diagnosis and its implications, I question the status of a third player: "nano-art." I then draw on some resources of French philosophy of technology and aesthetics to prompt a new alliance between "technology" (the study of technics) and aesthetics (the study of sensation) resulting in a re-conceptualization of design as "techno-aesthetics." The chapter closes by highlighting the political significance of such techno-aesthetic design for nanotechnology and beyond, for our everyday live amidst technoscientific objects.

International audience ; What is the status of "design" in nanotechnology? On the one hand, scientists doing nanotechnology refer to their activity as "design." On the other, the intervention of design researchers and practitioners remains confined to "the future" (i.e. societal applications and uses of nanotechnology). How are we to understand such a division of labour? To be sure it is not specific to nanotechnology but concerns the status of design in contemporary technoscience at large. However, the problem is more acute in the case of this "invisible" technology. Nanotechnology is supposed to be cut off from all sensible experience whereas design traditionally focuses on the shaping of the user's experience. After articulating the diagnosis and its implications, I question the status of a third player: "nano-art." I then draw on some resources of French philosophy of technology and aesthetics to prompt a new alliance between "technology" (the study of technics) and aesthetics (the study of sensation) resulting in a re-conceptualization of design as "techno-aesthetics." The chapter closes by highlighting the political significance of such techno-aesthetic design for nanotechnology and beyond, for our everyday live amidst technoscientific objects.

International audience ; This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical approach rather than with an epistemological critique. For this aim, I propose a 'techno-aesthetical' approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform the logic of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist philoso-phy, the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut distinction between image-as-representation and other modes of existence of images, such as the one of 'imaginaction' that I draw from a comparison between far-field and near-field microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished from representation, I focus on nano-technological percepts and argue that they follow a transmodal logic. I then draw the implic-ations of this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that changes the way we think of non-living objects. Finally, I conclude that if techno-aesthetics dares to posit and articulate sensibility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it simultaneously engages us to consider the political character of our responsibilities towards the design of nano-engineered sensorial spaces.

International audience ; This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical approach rather than with an epistemological critique. For this aim, I propose a 'techno-aesthetical' approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform the logic of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist philoso-phy, the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut distinction between image-as-representation and other modes of existence of images, such as the one of 'imaginaction' that I draw from a comparison between far-field and near-field microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished from representation, I focus on nano-technological percepts and argue that they follow a transmodal logic. I then draw the implic-ations of this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that changes the way we think of non-living objects. Finally, I conclude that if techno-aesthetics dares to posit and articulate sensibility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it simultaneously engages us to consider the political character of our responsibilities towards the design of nano-engineered sensorial spaces.

On a rarement, sinon jamais, rapproché Gilbert Simondon et Hannah Arendt. Pourtant, Du mode d'existence des objets techniques et Condition de l'homme moderne, parus la même année (1958), partagent une même question : celle du statut et du sens des artéfacts - " objets techniques " pour Simondon, " œuvres " pour Arendt - dans le type original d'être-au-monde en quoi consiste la réalité humaine. Cette question mène les deux auteurs à défendre un humanisme ne se réclamant d'aucun " propre de l'homme ", refusant de se laisser enfermer dans l'alternative entre " technique promotrice de l'humain " et " technique déshumanisante " et à critiquer la réduction de la technique au travail. Cependant, les deux pensées divergent nettement sur la question des rapports de l'être-objet et du processus d'une part, et de la technique et de la nature d'autre part. Cet article tente d'articuler ces points de rencontre et de divergence. La lecture croisée qui y est pratiquée souligne le rôle d'appariement du questionnement politique et du questionnement ontologique dévolu à la philosophie des techniques.

On a rarement, sinon jamais, rapproché Gilbert Simondon et Hannah Arendt. Pourtant, Du mode d'existence des objets techniques et Condition de l'homme moderne, parus la même année (1958), partagent une même question : celle du statut et du sens des artéfacts - " objets techniques " pour Simondon, " œuvres " pour Arendt - dans le type original d'être-au-monde en quoi consiste la réalité humaine. Cette question mène les deux auteurs à défendre un humanisme ne se réclamant d'aucun " propre de l'homme ", refusant de se laisser enfermer dans l'alternative entre " technique promotrice de l'humain " et " technique déshumanisante " et à critiquer la réduction de la technique au travail. Cependant, les deux pensées divergent nettement sur la question des rapports de l'être-objet et du processus d'une part, et de la technique et de la nature d'autre part. Cet article tente d'articuler ces points de rencontre et de divergence. La lecture croisée qui y est pratiquée souligne le rôle d'appariement du questionnement politique et du questionnement ontologique dévolu à la philosophie des techniques.

International audience ; The term " technoscience " gained philosophical significance in the 1970s but it aroused ambivalent views. On the one hand, several scholars have used it to shed light on specific features of recent scientific research, especially with regard to emerging technologies that blur boundaries (such as natural/artificial, machine/living being, knowing/making and so on); on the other hand, as a matter of fact " technoscience " did not prompt great interest among philosophers. In the French area, a depreciative meaning prevails: " technoscience " means the contamination of science by management and capitalism. Some even argue that " technoscience " is not a concept at all, just a buzzword. In this chapter, on the contrary, we make the case for the constitution of a philosophical concept of technoscience based on the characterization of its objects in order to scrutinize their epistemological, ontological, political and ethical dimensions.

International audience ; The term " technoscience " gained philosophical significance in the 1970s but it aroused ambivalent views. On the one hand, several scholars have used it to shed light on specific features of recent scientific research, especially with regard to emerging technologies that blur boundaries (such as natural/artificial, machine/living being, knowing/making and so on); on the other hand, as a matter of fact " technoscience " did not prompt great interest among philosophers. In the French area, a depreciative meaning prevails: " technoscience " means the contamination of science by management and capitalism. Some even argue that " technoscience " is not a concept at all, just a buzzword. In this chapter, on the contrary, we make the case for the constitution of a philosophical concept of technoscience based on the characterization of its objects in order to scrutinize their epistemological, ontological, political and ethical dimensions.

International audience ; The term " technoscience " gained philosophical significance in the 1970s but it aroused ambivalent views. On the one hand, several scholars have used it to shed light on specific features of recent scientific research, especially with regard to emerging technologies that blur boundaries (such as natural/artificial, machine/living being, knowing/making and so on); on the other hand, as a matter of fact " technoscience " did not prompt great interest among philosophers. In the French area, a depreciative meaning prevails: " technoscience " means the contamination of science by management and capitalism. Some even argue that " technoscience " is not a concept at all, just a buzzword. In this chapter, on the contrary, we make the case for the constitution of a philosophical concept of technoscience based on the characterization of its objects in order to scrutinize their epistemological, ontological, political and ethical dimensions.

International audience ; The term " technoscience " gained philosophical significance in the 1970s but it aroused ambivalent views. On the one hand, several scholars have used it to shed light on specific features of recent scientific research, especially with regard to emerging technologies that blur boundaries (such as natural/artificial, machine/living being, knowing/making and so on); on the other hand, as a matter of fact " technoscience " did not prompt great interest among philosophers. In the French area, a depreciative meaning prevails: " technoscience " means the contamination of science by management and capitalism. Some even argue that " technoscience " is not a concept at all, just a buzzword. In this chapter, on the contrary, we make the case for the constitution of a philosophical concept of technoscience based on the characterization of its objects in order to scrutinize their epistemological, ontological, political and ethical dimensions.

International audience ; The promises of nanotechnology have been framed by a variety of metaphors, that not only channel the attention of the public, orient the questions asked by researchers, and convey epistemic choices closely linked to ethical preferences. In particular, the image of the 'therapeutic missile' commonly used to present targeted drug delivery devices emphasizes precision, control, surveillance and efficiency. Such values are highly praised in the current context of crisis of pharmaceutical innovation where military metaphors foster a general mobilization of resources from multiple fields of cutting-edge research. The missile metaphor, reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich's 'magic bullet', has framed the problem in simple terms: how to deliver the right dose in the right place at the right moment? Chemists, physicists and engineers who design multi-functional devices operating in vitro can think in such terms, as long as the devices are not actually operating through the messy environment of the body. A close look at what has been done and what remains to be done suggests that the metaphor of the "therapeutic missile" is neither sufficient, nor even necessary. Recent developments in nanomedicine suggest that therapeutic efficacy cannot be obtained without negotiating with the biological milieu and taking advantage of what it affords. An 'oïkological' approach seems more appropriate, more heuristic and more promising than the popular missile. It is based on the view of organism as an oikos that has to be carefully managed. The dispositions of nanocapsules have to be coupled with the affordances of the environment. As it requires dealing with nanoparticles as relational entities (defined by their potential for interactions) rather than as stable substances (defined by intrinsic properties) this metaphor eventually might well change research priorities in nanotechnology in general.