Suchergebnisse

The World Bank is, from a financial standpoint, organised like a corporation. Using its top credit rating (AAA), it raises funds in the international capital markets like any other financial institution for on-lending to its borrowing clients. As of June 2006, almost half (US$ 100 billion) of its US$ 212 billion total assets were in loans, while the stock of borrowings from financial markets amounted to US$ 96 billion. Like a large financial conglomerate, the World Bank is actually a group comprising five entities. Its primary component is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 "to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes" (Art. I). Subsequently, four additional components were created to enhance the Bank's ability to fulfill its purpose. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established with the purpose of promoting the growth of the private sector in the economies of the World Bank's member countries. A few years later, in 1960, the International Development Association (IDA) was founded to provide financing to less-developed economies. Subsequently in 1985, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was added to provide guarantees against noncommercial, or political, risk to foreign investors in the developing countries that are members of MIGA. Finally, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1966, provides arbitration and conciliation for investment disputes between states and individual nationals of other states. (.)

This article explores how the Chinese Communist Party has relied in part on making global financial markets and institutions a source of external pressure to help pass domestic economic and financial reform. We explore two case studies of external financial liberalization: the listing of Chinese state-owned enterprises on foreign stock exchanges and the financial reform aspects of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. These studies show that external liberalization policies are interlinked with both micro- and macro-level reforms in the domestic economy. We conclude that, after 2005, this strategy of applying external pressure, in fact, did not lead to more comprehensive economic restructuring because the agents of external pressure - in this instance, foreign banks and accounting firms - were themselves party to the reinforcement of state control and ultimately did not (or could not) promote further external liberalization. Domestic agents that supported external liberalization were also quick to abandon it when external pressure conflicted with other domestic policy objectives. (J Contemp China/GIGA)