A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3405
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3405
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Working paper
In: Latin American development forum
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level - the first such data in the region - and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and n
In: Latin American Development Forum
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level - the first such data in the region - and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital.
In: Latin American development forum series
Privatization is under attack. Beginning in the 1980s, thousands of failing state-owned enterprises worldwide have been turned over to the private sector. But public opinion has turned against privatization. A large political backlash has been brewing for some time, infused by accusations of corruption, abuse of market power, and neglect of the poor. What is the real record of privatization and are the criticisms justified? Privatization in Latin America evaluates the empirical evidence on privatization in a region that has witnessed an extensive decline in the state's share of production over
In: Economics & politics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 78-123
ISSN: 1468-0343
The recent wave of terrorist attacks has increased the attention to money laundering activities, and the role played by the regulatory frameworks controlling feeder activities. We investigate empirically the determinants of money laundering and its regulation in close to 100 countries. We use various methodologies to put together a cross‐country dataset on proxies for money laundering and construct specific money laundering regulation indices based on specific laws and their enforcement. Results show that tougher money laundering regulation, particularly those that criminalize feeding activities and improve disclosure, are linked to lower levels of money laundering across countries. The relevance of historical factors in explaining the variation of money laundering regulation across countries sheds light on the theories of institutions and provides room for further action, particularly in the areas of the law that reduce the burden of proof, increase the liability of intermediaries and improve disclosure.
In: Economics & politics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 78-123
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Economics & Politics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 78-123
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Over the last 20 years, Mexico redefined the role of the state in its economy through an ambitious program to liberalize trade, promote efficiency and reduce the size and scope of the state-owned sector. In Mexico, privatization led to a significant improvement in firm performance, as profitability increased 24 percentage points and converged to levels similar to those of private firms. From this increase, at most 5 percent can be attributed to higher prices and 31 percent to transfers from workers, with the remaining 64 percent representing productivity gains. There is evidence that privatization provides other social benefits, as greater access to services, which usually follows privatization, leads to welfare gains for the poorest consumers that outweigh any increase in prices. Moreover, an often-overlooked aspect of privatization is its fiscal impact, whereby the proceeds from the sale are augmented by reduced subsidies and increased taxes and can help pay off debt or finance social spending. The Mexican privatization program can provide a valuable guide to privatization dos and don'ts: First, the privatization process must be carefully designed and run in a transparent way. Special requirements such as bans on foreign direct investment or cash-only payments lead to substantial price discounts for firms sold, while simplicity breeds competition and leads to higher prices. A transparent program can also help quell the tendency of politicians to favor their friends by tweaking the rules of the game. Second, restructuring firms prior to privatization is counterproductive in raising net sale prices and should be avoided. Governments spend substantial resources on politically motivated investment or efficiency programs that are not valued by bidders and which can rarely be justified on the social ground on which they are sold. Additionally, restructuring programs lengthen the privatization process considerably and lower prices for firms sold— in the case of Mexico, each month of delay reduced the sale price by 2. 2 percent. Finally, this paper argues that it is essential to carefully deregulate and re-regulate privatized firms to ensure that they behave appropriately as well as to provide a corporate governance framework to ensure firms are able to finance their operations without relying on the Government for help.
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In: Economia: journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 37-111
ISSN: 1533-6239
Critics of privatization argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better retrenchment programs. Using new data from a random sample of 400 companies in the world, we test competing theories about the wisdom of retrenchment programs and their effect on prices paid by buyers and re-hiring policies by private owners after privatization. Our results show that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, several labor retrenchment policies yield a negative impact on net privatization prices. In confirmation of the adverse selection argument, various types of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher frequency of re-hiring of the same workers by the new private owners. Compulsory skill-based programs are the only type of program that is marginally associated with higher prices and lower re-hiring rates after privatization, but the political and economic costs of this policy may make it somewhat impractical. A qualified "do not intervene" appears to be the safest bet with respect to labor retrenchment before privatization.
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Working paper
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In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming
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Working paper
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 163-188
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: NBER Working Paper No. w4152
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