Suchergebnisse

Errol Lord offers a new account of the nature of rationality: what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and dispels doubts about whether we ought to be rational.

Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.

There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight