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This article analyses how two contrasting enforcement systems, those of the UK (centralised) and Germany (decentralised), go about detecting and investigating transnational corporate bribery and corruption. Comparing these practices in contrasting systems is a useful empirical focus as both jurisdictions inhabit similar institutional contexts for corporate bribery (e.g. relatively strong western European economies, fellow members of the EU/G8, subject to international conventions) while both are considered 'active enforcers' of international bribery conventions, and therefore, being sufficiently involved in policing to have modes of enforcement to analyse. More specifically, the article examines the varied processes of detection and investigation within these differing systems and goes on to analyse how discretion is applied at both stages in the (de-)prioritisation of cases. The article outlines the strengths/limitations and differences/similarities of the two systems in terms of structure and practice, demonstrating how responsible authorities implement detection and investigative practices and why certain cases are focused on. The article argues that whether centralised or decentralised, and whether guided by flexible or rigid legal frameworks, formal and informal practices of discretion lead to legal and operational tensions that result in the accommodation of bribery by state authorities. © 2014 © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

"This edited collection analyses, from multiple disciplinary perspectives, the issue of corruption in commercial enterprise across different sectors and jurisdictions. Corruption is commonly recognised as a major social bad, and is seriously harmful to society, in terms of the functioning and legitimacy of political-economic systems, and the day-to-day lives of individuals. There is nothing novel about bribes in brown envelopes and dubious backroom deals, ostensibly to grease the wheels of business. Corrupt practices like these go to the very heart of illicit transacting in both legal markets such as kickbacks to facilitate contracts in international commerce and illegal markets such as payoffs to public officials to turn a blind eye to cross-border smuggling. Aside from the apparent pervasiveness and longevity of corruption in commercial enterprise, there is now renewed policy and operational attention on the phenomenon, prompting and meriting deeper analysis. Corruption in commercial enterprise, encompassing behaviours often associated with corporate and white-collar crime, and corruption in criminal commercial enterprise, where we see corruption central to organised crime activities, are major public policy issues. This collection gives us insight into their nature, organisation and governance, and how to respond most appropriately and effectively."--Provided by publisher.

This book argues that there is a strong normative argument for using the criminal law as a primary response to corporate crime. In practice, however, corporate crimes are rarely dealt with through criminal sanctioning mechanisms. Rather, the preference - for both prosecutors and corporates - appears to be on negotiating out of the criminal process. Reflecting this emphasis on negotiation, this book examines the use of Civil Recovery Orders and Deferred Prosecution Agreements as responses to corporate crime, and discusses a variety of UK case studies. Drawing upon legal and criminological backgrounds, and with an emphasis on the conceptual frameworks of 'negotiated justice' and 'legitimacy', the authors examine the law, policy and practice of these enforcement responses. They offer an original, theoretically-informed analysis which is accessible to practitioners and researchers.

Abstract
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are a legal tool for the nontrial resolution of cases of corruption. Each DPA is accompanied by a Statement of Facts that provides detailed and publicly available textual records of the given cases, including summarized evidence of who was involved, what they committed, and with whom. These statements can be translated into networks amenable to social network analysis allowing an analysis of the structure and dynamics of each case. In this study, we show how to extract information about which actors were involved in a given case, the relations and interactions among these actors (e.g., communication or payments), and their relevant individual attributes (gender, affiliation, and sector) from five Statements of Fact. We code the extracted information manually with two independent coders and subsequently, we assess the inter-coder reliability. For assessing the coding reliability of nodes and attributes, we use a matching coefficient, whereas for assessing the coding reliability of ties, we construct a network from the coding of each coder and subsequently calculate the graph correlations of the two resulting networks. The coding of nodes and ties in the five extracted networks turns out to be highly reliable with only slightly lower coding reliability in the case of the largest network. The coding of attributes is highly reliable as well, although it is prone to missing data on actors' gender. We conclude by discussing the flexibility of our data collection framework and its extension by including network dynamics and nonhuman actors (such as companies) in the network representation.

Public Law, 2020, Apr, 307-330. Negotiated settlements are increasingly regarded as an alternative tool against corporate criminality, with numerous countries now embracing such settlements. In England and Wales, amidst concerns relating to corporate criminal liability, the government introduced deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) in 2014. Five years on from their introduction in England and Wales, it is timely to re-examine the DPA regime, not least given its influence on developments in other jurisdictions. This article examines three key aspects of the development of the DPA regime to date, that, we argue, have resulted in a weak foundational basis for the regime notwithstanding its robust legal framework. Specifically, we explore: whether a DPA is in the public interest; the requirement of self-reporting; and the terms of a DPA. Even though there are admittedly only five Agreements to date, it is nonetheless useful to reflect upon the lessons to be learnt from these infant years. While DPAs were enacted to overcome obstacles to prosecuting companies and they have been widely lauded, we are not convinced by such contentions. The argument advanced in this article is that practice has been haphazard, rather than tied to any core principles, and lacks a clear underlying purpose. This situation is particularly evident in the three areas discussed in this article, which leads to the conclusion that the DPA regime stands on shaky foundations.