Suchergebnisse

Das bewährte Lehrbuch behandelt die Prinzipien der internationalen Arbeitsteilung, ihre Auswirkung auf die Volkswirtschaften, die Hypothesen zur Erklärung von Güterbewegungen und Faktorwanderungen, das Konzept des Handelsgleichgewichts sowie die Gewinne aus Handel und die Folgen von Handelspolitik. Zudem werden auch makroökonomische und monetäre Aspekte der internationalen Verflechtung erörtert. Dabei geht es um die Zahlungsbilanz, den Devisenmarkt und die Bestimmungsgründe des Wechselkurses. Die Autoren verdeutlichen die Zusammenhänge zwischen den realen und den monetären Gebieten der Außenwirtschaft anhand der verknüpfenden Variablen – Wechselkurs, Güterpreise und Geldmenge.Das Buch wurde für die 9. Auflage grundlegend überarbeitet, wobei wichtige neue Ansätze in die Darstellung aufgenommen wurden.Prof. Dr. Oliver Lorz lehrt Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen an der RWTH Aachen.Prof. Dr. Horst Siebert † war von 1989 bis 2003 Präsident des Kieler Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Hayek-Preisträger.

In this paper, we study how unilateral policies concerning certain conflict raw materials influence prices, illegal mining activities, and welfare. Firms in the North import natural resources from the South to produce final consumption goods. In one of the countries in the South, local groups attempt to access natural resources, which results in rent-seeking conflicts with the government and in illegal mining. We find that a unilateral embargo against the conflict country as well as certification of legal mines can reduce rent-seeking and illegal mining with different welfare consequences in the countries involved.

In this paper, we set up a theoretical model to study how unilateral policies aimed at improving transparency for consumers concerning the source of certain raw materials influence prices, illegal mining activities and welfare. The model distinguishes two regions in the world, North and South. Firms in the North import natural resources from the South to produce final consumption goods. In one of the countries, in the South, local groups attempt to access natural resources, which results in rent seeking conflicts with the government and illegal mining. We find that a unilateral embargo against the conflict country as well as certification of legal mines can reduce rent seeking and illegal mining with different welfare consequences in the countries involved.

In this paper, we develop a politico-economic model to analyze the relationship between the mode of international investment and institutional quality in a non-democratic capital importing country. Foreign investors from a capital-rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital-poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation, whereas in an integrated firm, this risk affects the foreign investor. This effect lowers the incentives for specific investments in an integrated firm and distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. By setting the institutional framework in the host country, the elite influences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment costs, influences institutional quality.