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The present dissertation examines an identity-based third-party intervention as a means to alleviate competitive, conflict-laden intergroup negotiations. Although intergroup negotiations between opposing group representatives are likely to result in impasse and suboptimal outcomes, little is known about specific means to overcome these impairments. To address this shortcoming it is assumed that intergroup negotiations are resolved more effectively when they involve a mediator who promotes the construction of a common ingroup identity between opposing representatives. Five studies are reported examining the newly developed common-identity mediation" (CIM) intervention in a professional mediation context (Field Study; N = 117), in an integrative win-win negotiation (Experiment 1; N = 100), in a distributive zero sum context (Experiment 2; N = 160), and in competitive intergroup disputes (Experiments 3 & 4; N = 160; N = 190). In addition, the effectiveness of CIM is compared to two well-established dispute resolution procedures. The underlying mechanism accounting for the beneficial CIM effects is examined (Experiments 2-4), and a moderating boundary condition for its applicability is illustrated (Experiment 4). Implications for negotiations, dispute resolution, social identity research, and third-party intervention are discussed.

The present research addresses the specific impairments of an intergroup negotiation context with respect to intergroup competitiveness and partial impasses. We examined whether mediation-arbitration (med-arb), a hybrid form of third-party intervention, is conducive to overcoming the detrimental effect of an intergroup negotiation context. Study 1 demonstrated the detrimental effect of an intergroup negotiation context and showed that mediation-arbitration is an effective means to overcome this detrimental effect in a distributive negotiation task. The findings of Study 1 further suggest that the beneficial effect of med-arb on negotiation outcomes can be explained in terms of an alleviation of intergroup competitiveness. Study 2 replicated the beneficial effect of mediation-arbitration in an integrative intergroup negotiation and, by means of comparing mediation-arbitration to straight mediation, corroborated the notion that the anticipated arbitration in med-arb is a necessary precondition to alleviate the competitiveness throughout the mediated negotiation process. Study 2 further revealed that the beneficial effect of med-arb on intergroup competitiveness can be explained in terms of the perceived decision control that disputants ascribed to the third party. The findings of the present research are discussed with respect to their contribution to future research on intergroup negotiation and third-party intervention.

A plethora of studies has demonstrated that low-power negotiators attain lower outcomes compared to high-power negotiators. We argue that this low-power disadvantage can be conceptualized as impaired goal attainment and that self-regulation can help to overcome it. Three experiments tested this assertion. In Study 1, low-power negotiators attained lower profits compared to their high-power opponents in a face-to-face negotiation. Negotiators who set themselves goals and those who additionally formed if-then plans prior to the negotiation overcame the low-power disadvantage. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these effects in computer-mediated negotiations: Low-power negotiators conceded more than high-power negotiators. Again, setting goals and forming additional if-then plans helped to counter the power disadvantage. Process analyses revealed that negotiators' concession-making at the start of the negotiation mediated both the low-power disadvantage and the beneficial effects of self-regulation. The present findings show how the low-power disadvantage unfolds in negotiations and how self-regulatory techniques can help to overcome it.

Previous research has shown that individuals discriminate against outgroup members in economic decision-tasks (e.g., Chen and Li 2009, Hett et al. 2017, see also Social Identity Theory, Tajfel and Turner 1979). In this paper, we examine senders' economic decisions in a dictator game, given that the receiver belongs to a refugee outgroup. First, we find that providing stylized information about the perspective of the receiver influences senders' social preferences. Second, we show that political preferences matter substantially. Our data reveal that senders' political orientation moderates the effect of information on their social preferences: While the information treatment strengthens social preferences towards outgroup members for more left-wing oriented participants, the treatment effect on participants who favor more right-wing parties is even negative. Our experiment allows to derive policy implications on how attitudes towards refugees could be altered.

The present research intends to shed light on an identity-based intergroup effect in negotiations by demonstrating that the mere perception of the negotiation as an instance of intergroup interaction suffices to impair the negotiation process and to deteriorate its outcomes. It was predicted that negotiators' salient group identities increase their competitive perceptions, reduce their concession behavior, and consequently lead to inferior negotiation outcomes. Study 1 revealed that solo negotiators with salient group identities achieved lower joint outcomes than negotiators with salient individual identities. Study 2 systematically explored the underlying mechanisms of this identity-based intergroup effect by analyzing negotiators' concession-making behaviors over the course of the negotiation. The results of the second experiment replicate the findings of the first study and further show that the detrimental effect of an identity-based intergroup context will occur in distributive as well as integrative negotiations. The findings of the present research are discussed with respect to their contribution to future research on intergroup negotiation.