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The present dissertation examines an identity-based third-party intervention as a means to alleviate competitive, conflict-laden intergroup negotiations. Although intergroup negotiations between opposing group representatives are likely to result in impasse and suboptimal outcomes, little is known about specific means to overcome these impairments. To address this shortcoming it is assumed that intergroup negotiations are resolved more effectively when they involve a mediator who promotes the construction of a common ingroup identity between opposing representatives. Five studies are reported examining the newly developed common-identity mediation" (CIM) intervention in a professional mediation context (Field Study; N = 117), in an integrative win-win negotiation (Experiment 1; N = 100), in a distributive zero sum context (Experiment 2; N = 160), and in competitive intergroup disputes (Experiments 3 & 4; N = 160; N = 190). In addition, the effectiveness of CIM is compared to two well-established dispute resolution procedures. The underlying mechanism accounting for the beneficial CIM effects is examined (Experiments 2-4), and a moderating boundary condition for its applicability is illustrated (Experiment 4). Implications for negotiations, dispute resolution, social identity research, and third-party intervention are discussed.

A plethora of studies has demonstrated that low-power negotiators attain lower outcomes compared to high-power negotiators. We argue that this low-power disadvantage can be conceptualized as impaired goal attainment and that self-regulation can help to overcome it. Three experiments tested this assertion. In Study 1, low-power negotiators attained lower profits compared to their high-power opponents in a face-to-face negotiation. Negotiators who set themselves goals and those who additionally formed if-then plans prior to the negotiation overcame the low-power disadvantage. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these effects in computer-mediated negotiations: Low-power negotiators conceded more than high-power negotiators. Again, setting goals and forming additional if-then plans helped to counter the power disadvantage. Process analyses revealed that negotiators' concession-making at the start of the negotiation mediated both the low-power disadvantage and the beneficial effects of self-regulation. The present findings show how the low-power disadvantage unfolds in negotiations and how self-regulatory techniques can help to overcome it.

Previous research has shown that individuals discriminate against outgroup members in economic decision-tasks (e.g., Chen and Li 2009, Hett et al. 2017, see also Social Identity Theory, Tajfel and Turner 1979). In this paper, we examine senders' economic decisions in a dictator game, given that the receiver belongs to a refugee outgroup. First, we find that providing stylized information about the perspective of the receiver influences senders' social preferences. Second, we show that political preferences matter substantially. Our data reveal that senders' political orientation moderates the effect of information on their social preferences: While the information treatment strengthens social preferences towards outgroup members for more left-wing oriented participants, the treatment effect on participants who favor more right-wing parties is even negative. Our experiment allows to derive policy implications on how attitudes towards refugees could be altered.