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Intergroup biases can manifest themselves between a wide variety of different groups such as people from different races, nations, ethnicities, political or religious beliefs, opposing sport teams or even arbitrary groups. In this review we provide a neuroscientific overview of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies that have revealed how group dynamics impact on various cognitive and emotional systems at different levels of information processing. We first describe how people can perceive the faces, words and actions of ingroup and outgroup members in a biased way. Second, we focus on how activity in brain areas involved in empathizing with the pain of others, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula (AI), are influenced by group membership. Third, we describe how group membership influences activity in brain areas involved in mentalizing such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Fourth, we discuss the involvement of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) in increased moral sensitivity for outgroup threats. Finally, we discuss how brain areas involved in the reward system such as the striatum and medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), are more active when experiencing schadenfreude for outgroup harm and when rewarding ingroup (versus outgroup) members. The value of these neuroscientific insights to better understand ingroup bias are discussed, as well as limitations and future research directions.

Participating in collective actions, or acts of social protest, is one of the primary means that citizens have of participating in democracy and seeking social change. In this article, we outline the ways in which: social identity provides a psychological foundation for collective actions; social norms shape the mobilization and particular direction (disruptive vs. conventional) of that protest; and participating in collective actions is psychologically consequential and sociopolitically complex. We use this platform to put forward a series of practical implications for activists, social movement and nongovernmental groups, and authorities, who seek to mobilize consequential collective action. We conclude that collective action is a fundamental tool in the battle for social equality and justice. To better understand, and engage with this phenomenon, policy makers and practitioners need to attend to its origins in collective, group‐based psychology.

The present article reports a longitudinal study of the psychological antecedents for, and outcomes of, collective action for a community sample of activists. At Time 1, activist identification influenced intentions to engage in collective action behaviours protesting the Iraq war, both directly and indirectly via perceptions of the efficacy of these behaviours for achieving group goals, as well as perceptions of individual‐level benefits. At Time 2, identification was associated with differences in the dimensions on which the movement's success was evaluated. In the context of the movement's failure to achieve its stated objectives of troop withdrawal, those with strong activist identity placed less importance on influencing government decision making. The implications are discussed in terms of models of collective action and social identity, focusing on a dynamic model that relates identification with a group to evaluations of instrumentality at a group and individual level; and to beliefs about strategic responses to achieve group goals.

The present article analyzes the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in terms of current theories of normative influence in intergroup conflict. The (conflicting) implications of various social psychological models of decision making for Western and American attempts to reduce the likelihood of further attacks are delineated. We examine the implications of social identity models and models of outgroup normative influence, as well as dynamic models of intergroup behavior that focus on the polarizing effects of outgroup hostility. The influence of Western responses is distinguished for various target audiences, including not only the terrorists, but also pro‐Western Muslims in North America and Europe, unaligned Muslims, and Muslims with anti‐American feelings who do not endorse terrorism.

This Element reviews the social psychology of effective collective action, highlighting the importance of considering activists' goals, timeframes, and psychological perspectives in seeking to conceptualise this construct. A novel framework 'ABIASCA' maps effectiveness in relation to activists' goals for mobilisation and change (Awareness raising; Building sympathy; turning sympathy into Intentions; turning intentions into Actions; Sustaining groups over time; Coalition-building; and Avoiding opponents' counter-mobilisation). We also review the DIME model of Disidentification, Innovation, Moralization and Energization, which examines the effects of failure in creating trajectories of activists' disidentification from collective action; innovation (including to radicalisation or deradicalisation); and increased moral conviction and energy. The social psychological drivers of effective collective action for four audiences are examined in detail, in four sections: for the self and supporters, bystanders, opponents, and for third parties. We conclude by highlighting an agenda for future research, and drawing out key messages for scholars.

This paper examines the recollections of civilians about the May 1998 riots in Indonesia, as told in an anonymous online survey. These riots caused the deaths of an estimated 1000 people and saw targeted attacks on Indonesia's ethnic Chinese community, including state-led mass sexual violence against Chinese-Indonesian women and girls. Despite their scale, there has never been any official redress for these riots and they remain a taboo topic in Indonesia, rarely discussed publicly. Little is known about how Indonesians remember these events, with research into the personal or collective memories about the riots challenging, given the public silencing by the government. Here, we present findings from an anonymous survey completed by 235 Indonesians in which they revealed sometimes deeply personal memories about the riots. Examined thematically, these memories both confirm general understandings of the riots and reveal novel information about how communities coped during the violence. (JCSA/GIGA)

Members of groups in conflict may take collective action: actions to improve conditions for their group as a whole. The psychological antecedents of collective action for groups that are party to conflict and inequality are well‐established. Comparatively little is known about how uninvolved outsiders respond to an external intergroup conflict. We investigate how personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) shape outsiders' willingness to take collective action in support of groups engaged in external conflict. In Study 1, U.S. residents read about conflicts between disadvantaged citizens and an advantaged government in Greece and Russia. In Study 2, U.S. residents read about a similar conflict in a fictional country, Silaria. Path analyses revealed that SDO and RWA shaped psychological appraisals of the conflict contexts, which predicted intentions to take collective action on behalf of either group. SDO and RWA were positively associated with advantaged group identification and anger at a disadvantaged group, and negatively associated with disadvantaged group identification and anger at an advantaged group. Group identification and anger predicted subsequent collective action intentions on behalf of either group. The sensitivity of outsiders' appraisals to ideological orientations suggests strategies for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups to recruit outsiders as allies in group conflict.

McCauley (this issue) develops an analysis of the predictors of sympathetic, incipient support for terrorism. While we endorse the conceptual focus on terrorism as a process, our concern is that the data reported by McCauley do not address predictors of sympathy for terrorism. Rather, aspects of that contribution conflate opposition to the War on Terror with incipient support for terrorism. This is intensely problematic not least because the data reported actually suggest that opposition to the War on Terror and sympathy for terrorism are distinct.

Subjective intergroup beliefs and authoritarianism were assessed in a field study (N = 255) of White Australians' anti-Asian stereotyping and prejudice. A social identity analysis of intergroup prejudice was adopted, such that perceptions of the intergroup structure (instability, permeability, legitimacy and higher ingroup status) were proposed as predictors of higher prejudice (blatant and covert) and less favorable stereotyping. Consistent with the social identity approach, both independent and interacting roles for sociostructural predictors of Anti-Asian bias were observed, even after demographic and personality variables were controlled. For example, perceived legitimacy was associated with higher prejudice when White Australians' status position relative to Asian Australians was valued. Moreover, when participants evaluated Whites' position as unstable and high status or legitimate, perceptions of permeable intergroup boundaries were associated with anti-Asian bias. The present findings demonstrate status protection responses in advantaged group members in a field setting, lending weight to the contention that perceptions of sociostructural threat interact to predict outgroup derogation. Implications for theories of intergroup relations are discussed.

Two studies in the context of English‐French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual‐level costs and benefits that drive expectancy‐value processes (rational decision‐making) from group‐level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group‐ and individual‐level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group‐level expectancy‐value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity‐driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self‐stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost‐benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy‐value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes.