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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter One. Civil War in the Contemporary Era -- Chapter Two. The Causes of Civil War: Individual and Group Analysis -- Chapter Three. State-Level Factors Leading to Civil War -- Chapter Four. International Effects on Civil Wars -- Chapter Five. Conflict Processes during Civil Wars -- Chapter Six. The Resolution of Civil Wars -- Chapter Seven. The Aftermath of Civil War -- Appendix A. List of Intrastate Conflicts, 1946–2000 -- References -- Index

Despite the abundance of research on the consequences of foreign military intervention for target countries, scant research has been devoted to the possible regional externalities of intervention. This article examines whether large-scale armed operations affect the likelihood of civil conflict onset in countries neighboring the target of intervention. We posit that interventions against the target regime reduce the government's ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory by diminishing its coercive and administrative capacity. This might, in turn, result in safe haven possibilities for neighboring rival groups in the target and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase the risk of civil conflict onset in the contiguous countries. Armed interventions supportive or neutral toward the target state, on the other hand, bolster the government's coercive capacity and mitigate ongoing crises in the target. Such armed intrusions might therefore undermine the likelihood of internal armed conflict in neighboring countries triggered by the factors associated with "bad neighborhoods": safe haven possibilities, transnational spread of arms, and refugee flows. To substantiate these claims, we use time-series, cross-national data for the 1951-2004 period. Results indicate that hostile interventions increase the probability of civil conflict onset in connected countries while supportive interventions have a regional pacifying effect, reducing the likelihood of domestic unrest in countries neighboring the target state. Neutral interventions, on the other hand, are unlikely to have any discernible effect on regional stability. Further, the primary motive of intervention, whether for humanitarian or other purposes, has no statistically significant impact on the stability of neighboring countries. (International Interactions/FUB)

This article traces the contours of emerging social science research on the resolution of civil conflict, which has been one of the more prevalent threats to sustainable peace since the Cold War. We present findings from our own research on the design of peace agreements and civil conflict, by first examining whether more elaborate and comprehensive agreements are also more effective, then by looking at the effect of intervention on civil war peace agreement design over the years 1975 to 2011. Results suggest that elaborate and comprehensive agreements are not as effective as one would suspect. Further, interventions by third parties do indeed impact agreement structure in predictable ways. We then recount how this research brought us into conversation with other political scientists whose work addresses vital elements of civil conflict resolution. We conclude with an introduction to the special issue that aims to bring scholars and practitioners together in one forum to examine and improve civil war peace processes.

While scholars have spent a good deal of time examining mediation processes, we know very little about unassisted negotiations in the midst of civil disputes. One of the primary goals of this research is to examine the factors that can bring about negotiations aimed at addressing core, underlying issues that brought about armed struggle. In order to do so, a comparative case study of Southeast Asia is presented. We find that unassisted negotiation of core issues can occur in intrastate rivalry under certain conditions. Interestingly, such efforts are unlikely to be won on the battlefield, but rather emerge following regime change or once mediation has paved the way for key issues to be addressed. Negotiations following regime change, while they tend to occur and involve core issues, continue to be influenced and challenged by the legacy of previous resolution efforts and historical memory.

While scholars have spent a good deal of time examining mediation processes, we know very little about unassisted negotiations in the midst of civil disputes. One of the primary goals of this research is to examine the factors that can bring about negotiations aimed at addressing core, underlying issues that brought about armed struggle. In order to do so, a comparative case study of Southeast Asia is presented. We find that unassisted negotiation of core issues can occur in intrastate rivalry under certain conditions. Interestingly, such efforts are unlikely to be won on the battlefield, but rather emerge following regime change or once mediation has paved the way for key issues to be addressed. Negotiations following regime change, while they tend to occur and involve core issues, continue to be influenced and challenged by the legacy of previous resolution efforts and historical memory. Adapted from the source document.

Multilateral and diplomatic resolutions to intrastate conflicts are the preferred method of termination. However, mediated settlements tend toward failure and conflict recurrence. A significant factor in this failure is that government and groups are heterogeneous. While the demands, goals, preferences, and intentions of both sides are sometimes viewed as being held in common, they are potentially as diverse as the groups' members. Understanding the relationship between resolution efforts and group heterogeneity is complicated but crucial to improving mediation success. The current article examines all intrastate conflicts for the period 1945–1999, in order to test two competing propositions found in the literature on group change and the occurrence of mediation. The primary question of interest is whether group change tends to result from or precede mediation attempts. In other words, is group change an impetus to engage in mediation or do mediation processes tend to result in altered group characteristics. The findings support only the proposition that when governments engage rebels in mediation, rebel group changes are significantly more likely to occur than without mediation. The implications of the findings are also discussed.

Non-violent movements are rarely confined to the borders of the societies in which they take place. International actors are prone to take a side in the face of such resistance. Yet knowledge is limited on external actors' effects on outcomes of non-violent protests abroad. Thus, we zero in on the strategic logic behind major powers' involvement decisions regarding such movements, and the impact those decisions have on campaign outcomes. We find that major powers tend to undermine non-violent movements when target states are strategically important; we find also an indirect link between major power support for movements and security force defections in target states, thus improving success prospects for the protestors. Our research adds a dyadic international dimension to the question of external support during non-violent resistance movements and expands the current knowledge base regarding the identity and direction of support

Civil wars are particularly challenging to resolve via mediated negotiations. Practitioners and policy makers employ a variety of approaches to help move warring actors from war to peace. To assist in this process, peace researchers have examined civil war peace processes from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, scholars assume their research will be useful beyond simply accumulating knowledge. It has become evident, however, that the research has not in fact informed policy and practice. This article begins by examining the articles presented in this two‐part special issue (April and July 2018) aimed at improving the scholar‐practitioner divide. Practical lessons derived from the research are presented. These lessons are followed by a frank assessment of what practitioners need from scholars, as well as recommendations for better bridging this important theory‐to‐practice divide.

The success rate of military intervention has traditionally been judged by its ability to end conflict and/or serve intervener security interests. However, contemporary military intervention in troubled or collapsing states is often intended not only to increase security but also to establish conditions in which political reform or reconstruction can proceed. Judging the success of intervention therefore means isolating and measuring its impact on internal change. Scholars and policymakers have staked many assumptions on the belief that the motivation and form of military intervention might improve conditions for peacebuilding over time. Among these are expectations that multilateral interventions undertaken for purposes of social reconstruction and reform might be the best hopes for security and long-term stability. The data tested here generally give reason for pause in such assumptions. Our findings only slightly support neoliberal arguments and assumptions about the superiority of multilateral or neutral interventions in promoting postintervention peace, reform, and stability. Rather, our findings indicate that regardless of type of intervener, target state governance, physical quality of life, and economic growth are not much impacted by intervention. Adapted from the source document.