Suchergebnisse

Assume a labor supply consisting of two types of workers, 1 and 2. Both workers are equally productive and exhibit supply functions with the same elasticity. We consider a firm (entrepreneur or shareholders) that is competitive in the output market and monopsonistic in input markets. The firm uses the services of a manager who has a high human capital and whose wage is given by the market. It is supposed that the manager does not like to work with one type of worker, say type 1. If we allow the manager's effort to be an additional input without any extra (in addition to his salary) cost for the firm, then the firm's pricing decision will be different for both workers. That is, there will be a wage differential and therefore endogenous economic discrimination2 in the labor markets.

O objetivo deste artigo consiste identificar a influência de diversos fatores relacionados com a renda do agricultor familiar, que podem reforçar ou não a idéia básica contida na política de fortalecimento da agricultura familiar implementada pelo Governo desde 1996. Os retornos foram estimados baseados em regressão linear (OLS) em dois estágios, com a equação do segundo momento sendo corrigida pela incorporação da razão inversa de Mills gerada com o resultado do modelo probit, onde é estimada a possibilidade do horticultor demandar ou não crédito. Ficou evidenciada a desvantagem da negociação através dos grandes supermercados, que tendem a comprimir, conforme constatado por Melo (2001), a remuneração dos fornecedores de hortaliças.

This paper investigates whether minorities in academe exercise bargaining power in a way that influences hiring of other minority faculty. We develop a stylized model that shows how minorities influence the hiring of other minorities, taking into account the hiring of majority faculty. We postulate that such behavior is similar to the behavior of insider workers in the context of the insider-outsider literature.