Abstract Both animals and human toddlers can find an object in a rectangular enclosure after they have been disoriented. They use geometric cues (relative lengths of walls) to discriminate among different corners (e.g. long wall to the left, short to the right). It has been claimed that this ability is 'modular', i.e. exclusively geometric. The present study demonstrates that the ability toddlers exhibit is a more general one, namely, an ability to discriminate relative quantity. Using a square enclosure, we show that toddlers use the relative sizes of the figures on different walls to characterize different corners. We also show that they do not use simple non‐relative features to distinguish different corners. Possible reasons for differences in the ability to use relative versus non‐relative cues are discussed.
AbstractAccumulating evidence suggests that there is a spontaneous preference for numerical, compared to non‐numerical (e.g., cumulative surface area), information. However, given a paucity of research on the perception of non‐numerical magnitudes, it is unclear whether this preference reflects a specific bias towards number, or a general bias towards the more perceptually discriminable dimension (i.e., number). Here, we found that when the number and area of visual dot displays were matched in mathematical ratio, number was more perceptually discriminable than area in both adults and children. Moreover, both adults and children preferentially categorized these ratio‐matched stimuli based on number, consistent with previous work. However, when number and area were matched in perceptual discriminability, a different pattern of results emerged. In particular, children preferentially categorized stimuli based on area, suggesting that children's previously observed number bias may be due to a mismatch in the perceptual discriminability of number and area, not an intrinsic salience of number. Interestingly, adults continued to categorize the displays on the basis of number. Altogether, these findings suggest a dominant role for area during childhood, refuting the claim that number is inherently and uniquely salient. Yet they also reveal an increased salience of number that emerges over development. Potential explanations for this developmental shift are discussed.Research Highlights Previous work found that children and adults spontaneously categorized dot array stimuli by number, over other magnitudes (e.g., area), suggesting number is uniquely salient. However, here we found that when number and area were matched by ratio, as in prior work, number was significantly more perceptually discriminable than area. When number and area were made equally discriminable ('perceptually‐matched'), children, contra adults, spontaneously categorized stimuli by area over number (and other non‐numerical magnitudes). These findings suggest that area may be uniquely salient early in childhood, with the previously‐observed number bias not emerging until later in development.
AbstractThere is general agreement that humans represent numerical, spatial, and temporal magnitudes from early in development. However, there is disagreement about whether different magnitudes converge within a general magnitude system and whether this system supports behavioral demonstrations of cross‐magnitude interactions at different developmental time points. Using a longitudinal design, we found a relation between children's cross‐magnitude interactions assessed at two developmental time points with different behavioral measures. More specifically, stronger cross‐magnitude interactions in infancy (M = 9.3 months) predicted a stronger cross‐magnitude congruity effect at preschool age (M = 44.2 months), even when controlling for performance on measures of inhibitory control, analogical reasoning, and verbal competence at preschool age. The results suggest a common mechanism for cross‐magnitude interactions at different points in development as well as stability of the underlying individual differences. We argue that this mechanism reflects a nonverbal general magnitude system that is operational early in life and that displays continuity from infancy to preschool age.
AbstractA growing body of evidence suggests that non‐symbolic representations of number, which humans share with nonhuman animals, are functionally related to uniquely human mathematical thought. Other research suggesting that numerical and non‐numerical magnitudes not only share analog format but also form part of a general magnitude system raises questions about whether the non‐symbolic basis of mathematical thinking is unique to numerical magnitude. Here we examined this issue in 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children using comparison tasks of non‐symbolic number arrays and cumulative area as well as standardized tests of math competence. One set of findings revealed that scores on both magnitude comparison tasks were modulated by ratio, consistent with shared analog format. Moreover, scores on these tasks were moderately correlated, suggesting overlap in the precision of numerical and non‐numerical magnitudes, as expected under a general magnitude system. Another set of findings revealed that the precision of both types of magnitude contributed shared and unique variance to the same math measures (e.g. calculation and geometry), after accounting for age and verbal competence. These findings argue against an exclusive role for non‐symbolic number in supporting early mathematical understanding. Moreover, they suggest that mathematical understanding may be rooted in a general system of magnitude representation that is not specific to numerical magnitude but that also encompasses non‐numerical magnitude.
AbstractIt is surprising that there are inconsistent findings of transitive inference (TI) in young infants given that non‐linguistic species succeed on TI tests. To conclusively test for TI in infants, we developed a task within the social domain, with which infants are known to show sophistication. We familiarized 10‐ to 13‐month‐olds (M = 11.53 months) to a video of two dominance interactions between three puppets (bear > elephant; hippo > bear) consistent with a dominance hierarchy (hippo > bear > elephant; where '>' denotes greater dominance). Infants then viewed interactions between the two puppets that had not interacted during familiarization. These interactions were either congruent (hippo > elephant) or incongruent (elephant > hippo) with the inferred hierarchy. Consistent with TI, infants looked longer to incongruent than congruent displays. Control conditions ruled out the possibility that infants' expectations were based on stable behaviors specific to individual puppets rather than their inferred transitive dominance relations. We suggest that TI may be supported by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of ordinal representation and visuospatial processing that come online early in human development.
