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Recently, Victoria Hattam and William Forbath have separately defended new explanations of the development of the distinctive, relatively apolitical labor movement in the United States. Their explanations differ from earlier accounts that saw the failure of socialism in the United States as the result of either the distinctive liberal tradition in the United States or of ethnic and other divisions within the working class. Their alternative view is that distinctive structural features of the U.S. state – in particular, the independent judiciary – played a decisive role in shaping the development of the labor movement. This paper questions some of the shared assumptions of these new accounts, focusing on Victoria Hattam's recent book,Labor Visions and State Power. Without denying that the judiciary played an important role in the development of the U.S. labor movement, I want to suggest a different account of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches.

&P&&DIV&Since at least the time of Tocqueville, observers have noted that Americans draw on the language of rights when expressing dissatisfaction with political and social conditions. As the United States confronts a complicated set of twenty-first-century problems, that tradition continues, with Americans invoking symbolic events of the founding era to frame calls for change. Most observers have been critical of such "rights talk." Scholars on the left worry that it limits the range of political demands to those that can be articulated as legally recognized rights, while conserva

Since at least the time of Tocqueville, observers have noted that Americans draw on the language of rights when expressing dissatisfaction with political and social conditions. As the United States confronts a complicated set of twenty-first-century problems, that tradition continues, with Americans invoking symbolic events of the founding era to frame calls for change. Most observers have been critical of such "rights talk." Scholars on the left worry that it limits the range of political demands to those that can be articulated as legally recognized rights, while conservatives fear that it creates unrealistic expectations of entitlement. Drawing on a remarkable cache of Depression-era complaint letters written by ordinary Americans to the Justice Department, George I. Lovell challenges these common claims. Although the letters were written prior to the emergence of the modern civil rights movement-which most people assume is the origin of rights talk-many contain novel legal arguments, including expansive demands for new entitlements that went beyond what authorities had regarded as legitimate or required by law. Lovell demonstrates that rights talk is more malleable and less constraining than is generally believed. Americans, he shows, are capable of deploying idealized legal claims as a rhetorical tool for expressing their aspirations for a more just society while retaining a realistic understanding that the law often falls short of its own ideals

Judges in the United States are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials who sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions

Stuart Scheingold's The Politics of Rights provided a path-breaking theoretical analysis of what he called the "myth of rights." Scheingold's key insight was that even though rights were a myth, rights ideologies nevertheless left a significant imprint on American politics. The book charted a research agenda that has now been followed by a wide range of sociolegal scholars. Looking across that diverse body scholarship, I find convergence on two points. First, scholars claim that law and legal ideology contribute to processes of legitimation and to political acquiescence. Second, and seemingly in tension with the first, most people do not appear to believe in idealized legal myths and express only qualified commitments to legal ideals. Most scholars have responded to this tension by downplaying evidence that people have doubts about legal ideals, often treating expressions of doubts as evidence of confusion. As a result, scholars still conclude that residual commitments to legal myths help to explain legitimation and acquiescence. Such moves produce accounts of legal myths that are insufficiently attentive to politics and power. Scholars would do better to return to Scheingold's more ambivalent perspective on the politics of rights in order to understand the political consequences of commitments to rights' ideologies. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

A discussion of the 1908 Supreme Court case, Adair v. US, which struck down Section 10 of the Erdman Act of 1898, argues that the decision's impact was different than suggested in most historical accounts. The court ruled that Section 10, which made it a misdemeanor for railroad industry employers to blacklist union members or make employees sign contracts promising not to join a union, was unconstitutional because it hindered "liberty of contract." It is contended that hidden motivations influenced participants in the legislative process, suggesting the Act was neither a clear victory for labor, nor a reflection of any labor organization's political clout. Rather, the "legislative baseline framework" led scholars to overestimate labor's legislative successes. The relationship between Congress & the courts is explored, stressing the danger of assuming that passage of legislation that benefits specific labor organizations automatically indicates that they have a high degree of political power. It is also maintained that Congress distorted the democratic process by giving courts the authority to decide the shape of specific policies. J. Lindroth