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Great power authority in world politics -- Paths as predators and parasites of great power authority -- Enemies of all mankind? : the Barbary Corsairs in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries -- "We may defy moral criticism if our execution shall correspond to the principles we profess" : British moral authority and the Barbary pirates -- "This country will define our times, not be defined by them" : 9/11 and the war on terror

Autoethnography is a way and method to reflect on the mutual constitution of the self and the social. It allows one to consider how her/his personal and professional subjectivity was constructed and how her/his actions in the world reproduce or change this world. Autoethnography enables one to acquire an agentive role in the world by highlighting one's uniqueness and voice. It also aims to create mutual empowerment among people, ordinary individuals, by means of identification, connectivity, and empathy. In this article I explore some conceptual issues relating to autoethnography and then present my personal account of why I study International Relations (IR) and how I decided to bring myself more openly into my texts and lectures. I conclude by arguing that autoethnography made me more confident in sounding my voice in print and in class, and that, consequently, I became much more aware of the human capacity to make a difference. Adapted from the source document.

This paper offers a critical perspective on the growing phenomenon of governance indicators in international politics. I employ a governmentality approach to shed light on the political meanings & outcomes of the increasing tendency of various international actors to rate & rank the governance capacities & performances of states. In particular, I argue that, beyond being an analytic tool or an advisory system for governments, this practice in fact reproduces structures of authority & hierarchy in the international system. Power & knowledge are bound together in many governance indicators, as powerful states either examine themselves, the quality of governance of Third World states, or adopt the examinations carried out by other agents. Consequently, poor & developing states cannot simply ignore these ratings & rankings. The governance indicators establish a discursive field of state legitimacy & normalcy & 'responsibilities' states'. construct them as ethical actors that are capable of correct & responsible choices & policies. As a result, the responsibility of powerful states & international actors for a host of social, economic & political problems in many Third World countries is obscured. Therefore the paper calls for closer attention to be paid to the elements of power in these governance indicators. References. Adapted from the source document.

What are the connections between personal risk-management and governmental responsibility toward citizens? This paper argues that governments in neoliberal societies increasingly acknowledge a responsibility to help citizens make 'informed choices' in order to reduce or avoid risk. A key feature within this framework is the issuing of official governmental advice to the citizens. But such advice does not merely carry information that citizens are free to accept or decline. Rather, it also consists of a conscious effort on part of governments to construct individuals as calculating, prudent, and rational persons that know how to manage risk (to 'responsibilize' them). Below I examine the practice of governmental advice as an effort of responsibilization in the case of travel warnings issued by foreign offices to international travelers. Adapted from the source document.

This paper raises the issue of moral credibility in international relations & shows that considerations of preserving moral prestige can become crucial for armed humanitarian intervention. It contrasts realist & constructivist explanations about the causes of humanitarian intervention & demonstrates that traditional accounts do not provide a complete understanding of the phenomenon of intervention. In the case studied here, GB engaged in a relatively costly humanitarian intervention against the Barbary pirates, slave trade in Christian Europeans due to her willingness to defy moral criticism & exhibit consistency with her professed moral principles. No material incentives &/or constraints influenced the British decision, & neither was it affected by a sense of felling, with regard to the Christian slaves. Instead, allegations that GB urged Europe to abolish the black slave trade out of selfish interests, while at the same time turning a blind eye toward the Christian slave trade of the pirates, undermined British moral prestige & became the cause of the Barbary expedition. 97 References. Adapted from the source document.

An examination of global security evaluates increasing allegations by politicians & officials in the Western world that the activities of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are a threat to national/international security both by themselves & in conjunction with terrorism. The most common arguments used to support these claims are assessed in light of empirical evidence & the concept of security in international relations theory. It is argued that the security threat posed by TCOs is significantly less than claimed & there are far fewer links between TCOs & terrorists than suggested. It is emphasized that overuse of the term "threat to security" could add to fear-mongering & create a theoretical blurring of the concept of security. Labeling TCOs a security threat not only fails to help in finding solutions to the societal, economic, & public health problems created by drug traffickers & other criminals, but may actually exacerbate them. J. Lindroth

Includes bibliographical references (p. 241-263) and index. ; Great power authority in world politics -- Paths as predators and parasites of great power authority -- Enemies of all mankind? : the Barbary Corsairs in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries -- "We may defy moral criticism if our execution shall correspond to the principles we profess" : British moral authority and the Barbary pirates -- "This country will define our times, not be defined by them" : 9/11 and the war on terror. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Terror threats and fear of ethnic and religious outbursts, combined with the aspirations of governments to better integrate immigrants into society, have led a growing number of Western states to adopt the practice of citizenship tests as a prerequisite for full citizenship. These tests require the immigrant, usually of non-Western origin, to demonstrate advanced language skills as well as comprehensive civic and cultural knowledge of the host society. While existing literature focuses either on internal inconsistencies within civic integration policies or on the models of citizenship reflected in the exams, the present article offers a critical and power-centered approach to the subject. Using a Foucauldian perspective, we analyze the tests as a sign of authority, a technology of naturalizing authority, and a disciplinary tool. This study joins a growing body of literature on the concept of governmentality, putting the spotlight on the 'microphysics of power', specifically at borders and liminal points where the state's presence is prominent. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright PRIO, www.prio.no]

This paper conceptualizes the phenomenon of revenge in international politics and seeks to specify the conditions that increase or diminish the tendency of states to take revenge against enemies. We situate the discussion of revenge within the broader context of emotions in IR. We argue that whether or not a state will take revenge depends on the combinations of three interrelated and mutually constitutive variables: (1) the degree to which a state emotionally experiences harm against it as morally outrageous, (2) the extent of humiliation the harmed state feels, and (3) the degree to which international retaliation is institutionalized by rules and laws that govern the use of cross-border force. We examine the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) as a case of revenge in international politics. Adapted from the source document.

This article suggests that institutions of violence in the international system sanction Great Power (GP) authority in this system. We argue that the degree to which Great Powers (GPs) construe various threats as challenges to their international authority informs their use of force against the sources of these threats. Serious challenges to GP authority prompt punishment not only to achieve rational and utilitarian ends (such as secession of harm or deterrence), but also to reproduce authority and reify it. We examine in this respect the US-led War on Terror and argue that the US response to the 9/11 terror attacks was largely constituted by the acute and unprecedented challenge to America's GP authority that these attacks symbolized. We conclude by reflecting upon the dilemmas the United States now faces to its GP authority. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]